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introduction: changing paradigms
Comparative criminal justice is the study of what people and institutions 
in different places do – and should do – about crime problems. More 
broadly, it looks for links between crime, social order and punishment, 
and explores the role played by police, prosecutors, courts, prisons 
and other actors and institutions in the wider context of various forms 
of social control. In this opening chapter I describe how established 
undergraduate USA textbooks deal with these issues and contrast this 
with the types of work found in journals, edited collections and mono-
graphs which provide evidence of the paradigm change that this area of 
enquiry is currently undergoing.
There is little need to insist on the wider relevance of this subject. It 
is impossible to open a newspaper, watch television or check the inter-
net without coming across matters that involve comparative criminal 
justice. There are still very real differences worldwide in what is seen 
as the proper role of criminal law, in resort to criminal justice systems 
as compared to other forms of sanctioning, in the political independ-
ence of the legal system, in the behaviour of police, the powers of 
prosecutors, lay or expert involvement, the rights of victims, the use 
of prison or the death penalty, or the extent of ‘trial by media’. Such 
contrasts give rise to difficult political and policy questions. What is 
to be done – if anything – about what seem like barbaric practices in 
far away places? Can a society borrow reforms successfully from other 
places? The media in Western countries tend to magnify news of dif-
ferences from and in the Islamic world. But there are also puzzling 
differences nearer among Western countries. How can we explain why 
incarceration rates in the USA are six to seven times as high as in most 
European countries – will the use of prison elsewhere follow this lead? 
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Why, for example, in 2008 did criminal court judges in Italy appeal to 
the United Nations to save them from the attacks of Prime Minister 
Berlusconi? Whatever answers are offered are likely to touch on genu-
ine specificities about the current role of courts and prisons in these 
countries as compared to others.
As these examples also testify, however, it is getting difficult to 
distinguish what goes on ‘here’ from what goes on ‘there’. In many 
countries crime is attributed to the growth of immigration – indeed, in 
Continental Europe unauthorised migration has itself been turned into 
a crime that ends up occupying much of the ordinary work of the lower 
courts. The obsession with crime and punishment, in which a large part 
of the news media is increasingly taken up, not only worries us with 
criminality next door, but also (selectively) with that taking place in the 
rest of the global village. In the UK, when the tabloid Sun newspaper 
is unable to find a sufficiently shocking crime at home, so as to create 
alarm at home, it increasingly refers to events in foreign countries. But 
even the normally sober Independent newspaper carried a leader recently 
warning its readers: 
the forces of terror do not respect national boundaries. And those pre-
pared to murder and die for a perverted interpretation of Islam are not 
easily identified. We need to wake up to the fact that we will never be 
able to safeguard Britain’s streets totally so long as violent extremism has 
its base in Pakistan. (Independent, 11 April 2009)
At the same time, if crime threats come from abroad, so too do interna-
tional institutions increasingly take on judicial or regulatory tasks.
If this were not enough of a challenge, there is more. There are also 
‘second-order’ (and higher) comparative questions to be explored 
(Nelken, 2007a). In order to decide how (and how far) to harmonise 
what they do with what others do, comparing becomes an intrinsic 
part of the practical tasks of many of those crafting and administering 
criminal justice. Thus in order to study such processes we must also 
explore the way others make comparisons – which will often reveal 
the ‘interested’ interpretations of criminal justice practices by politi-
cians, policy-makers, legal actors, journalists, activists, scholars and 
others.
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Changing paradigms
The aim of this book is to give some idea of the benefits, difficulties and, 
hopefully, also the excitement, of systematic study of the workings of 
criminal justice in and across different places. But this is very much a 
field which is struggling to keep up with the changes it seeks to describe 
and explain. This can be seen if we turn to consider currently available 
(typically American) codified ‘knowledge’ of what comparative criminal 
justice has to offer. I do not propose to offer here a detailed exegesis of 
the various American textbooks in this subject, such as Reichel (2008), 
now in its fifth edition, or Dammer, Fairchild and Albanese (2005), 
Fields and Moore (2005), and Cole, Frankowski and Gertz (1987), and I 
take for granted the many positive features they each have as teaching 
tools for opening students’ minds to other ways of doing things, which 
is their principal purpose. My comments have only to do with the type 
of theoretical approaches that they mobilise, the political assumptions 
they make, and the methodological problems they pass over. 
In the choice between coverage and depth, most textbooks tend to 
give preference to the former. But in so far as they are often obliged to 
draw on official reports (or websites), this begs the question of the reli-
ability and validity of the sources chosen. We learn little about the pos-
sible biases of the sources consulted, such as the interest they may have 
in exaggerating or minimising levels of crime, or the need to furnish 
politically acceptable accounts of law enforcement in justifying inter-
vention abroad or hiding collusion at home. Bureaucratic statistics have 
well-known limitations: such data are produced for internal purposes, 
often what they say in furnishing the information to those collecting 
it more centrally will have financial or other implications for them. No 
study of domestic criminal justice would now rely on official statistics 
to this extent – so why do so in cross-national work? 
Partly because of the sources that they rely on, the textbooks also 
concentrate overwhelmingly on conventional crime, and it is rare to 
find much discussion of white-collar and corporate crime, whether local 
or imported. Crime is assumed to be a problem for everyone, crime con-
trol a blessing, under-enforcement and delay a matter of organisational 
malfunctioning rather than an indicator of political priorities. Little is 
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said about the ways responding to (but not necessarily reducing) local 
and international crime can serve as a way for governments to gain and 
maintain legitimacy, or about how criminal justice works to control the 
poor and ethnic minorities. Terrorism is always against the state, never 
by the state (or at least not by ‘our’ state). 
The goals of classification and description predominate over system-
atic efforts at explanation or interpretation. Classifications of types of 
jurisdiction borrow heavily from the not always illuminating categories 
used by comparative law, as with the contrast between the common law 
and civil law or adversarial and inquisitorial systems. But even reference 
to more sophisticated efforts to develop classifications can be misleading 
if account is not taken of social change. Many of the textbooks still rely 
on Damaška’s now classic contrast between common law, ‘coordi-
nate’, systems and continental, ‘policy-oriented’, systems (Damaška, 
1986) even though we are now living at a time when American ‘problem-
oriented’ courts are a major export (Nolan, 2009). Descriptions of the 
organisation and functions of police, prosecutors and judges tell us 
whether they are organised centrally or not. But this is of little help in 
understanding why, in Italy, for example, the two major national police 
forces continue to co-exist with overlapping powers – a question that 
points to the significance of ‘redundancy’ in the organisation of crimi-
nal justice and social control more generally. Little is said about the 
role of actors other than the police in so-called ‘pre-crime’ measures of 
surveillance and crime prevention, as seen in the responsibilities placed 
on truck drivers and airlines to stop illegal immigration, or the increas-
ing importance of private companies in running prisons.
Differences in various jurisdictions are picked out against the reas-
suring bedrock of the presumed similarity of ‘criminal justice’, as if 
this term is a universal cross-cultural category. Discussions of police, 
prosecution and courts in the different chapters avoid asking what, if 
anything, it is that makes them part of a larger ‘system’. (The USA, for 
example, has a highly fragmented federal, state and local system but 
presupposes its overall coherence. Continental countries have more 
integrated national systems, but do not always expect or get collabora-
tion between the constituent parts.) Above all, accounts of what goes 
on in other jurisdictions often pay little or no attention to the differ-
ences between the ‘law in books’ – what the rules say about what is 
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supposed to happen – and the ‘law in action’ – how the law is or is 
not used in practice (Pound, 1910; Nelken, 1984, 2009c). Such empiri-
cal discussions as are provided give exaggerated ‘authority’ to dated 
and controversial empirical forays by English-speaking scholars in the 
foreign countries concerned. If we are to believe some of the current 
textbooks, the British are still fighting the IRA. Reliance is placed on 
a study of juvenile justice in Italy by Edwin Lemert carried out in the 
1980s using court data from the 1970s, even though the current system 
of juvenile procedure has undergone two major changes since then. 
We are led to believe that such one-off studies can be used somehow 
to ‘represent’ the essence of another system of criminal justice – and 
there is rarely acknowledgement of the differences and internal strug-
gles within each system.
Problems are also created by the disciplinary division in much 
English-language writing, between those who approach comparative 
criminal justice from a background in criminology and those who write 
about it as lawyers interested in criminal procedure. Few of the authors 
recommending more widespread adoption of common law trial proce-
dures (e.g. Vogler, 2005) address the question of whether this might 
lead to higher levels of incarceration, even though common law 
countries are among those with the highest prison rates. In general, 
little insight is offered about what is involved in making compari-
sons, the problems of overcoming obstacles of language and culture, 
and the enormous difficulties that can be faced in trying to understand 
other ways of life. No real guidance is provided on the actual process of 
doing cross-cultural research.
Do rates of punishment have anything to do with levels of crime? 
When (and why) do places punish too much? Why do countries bor-
row criminal justice innovations from cultures they affect to despise? 
How can practices be both culturally embedded and yet transferable? 
How and why do different systems respond as they do to the chal-
lenges of transnational crime? Questions such as these cannot easily 
be addressed within the old descriptive/classificatory paradigm. To get 
nearer to answers to such matters we need to tackle interpretative prob-
lems such as how different societies conceive ‘disorder’, and how ‘differ-
ences in social, political and legal culture inform perceptions of crime 
and the role of criminal agencies in responding to it’ (Zedner, 1996). 
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The choice to cover a lot of ground rather than go into these and 
other matters certainly reflects the type of student market and the pri-
orities of undergraduate education in a large and varied country such 
as the USA, where knowledge of even the most basic facts about what 
goes on elsewhere in the rest of the world cannot be taken for granted. 
In fairness, too, these authors are often the first to acknowledge the 
difficulties of finding satisfactory data, and not least, the handicap of 
working without sufficient studies in depth of the ‘law in action’ to 
rely upon. For many of the places being described, it is only recently 
that relevant empirical material about the ‘law in action’ has begun to 
become available. But it can hardly be denied that something of a gulf 
has grown up between what they present as ‘knowledge’ and the wider, 
more varied and ambitious criminological literature that would prob-
lematise such ‘knowledge’. Moreover, as will be seen in the course of 
this book, my critique of the field also goes well beyond the textbooks 
to encompass other scholarly enterprises, including those I describe as 
‘comparison by juxtaposition’, whereby it is assumed, rather than dem-
onstrated, that local experts’ accounts of different places are speaking 
to the same issues, as well as the many studies that place reliance on the 
commensurability of indicators such as prison rates.
Better answers to why practices of punishment take the form they 
do in different places have to make reference to the vast historical and 
social scientific literature available. We need to be able to demonstrate 
how larger forces shape and are shaped by the details of institutional 
structures and criminal procedure. We need to pay close attention to 
the definition and reach of the concepts of crime, of criminal justice 
and of social control which the observer and the observed employ; 
the persuasive tropes used in the discourse of criminal justice officials, 
politicians and criminologists themselves; the changing local and glo-
bal social contexts which shape what is being studied; the sources of 
the standpoints being adopted; and the practical purposes and possi-
ble implications of research itself. The resources to draw on include, 
most obviously – but strangely neglected – criminology itself (a ‘rendez-
vous subject’ of various disciplines), comparative law, legal theory and 
philosophy, political economy, political science and sociology, social 
theory, international law and international relations, and cross-cultural 
psychology. And this list is far from exhaustive. 
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Obviously, we should not expect all these disciplines to speak with 
one voice. For example, history and anthropology in particular, unlike, 
say, much work in political science or economics, tend to favour inter-
pretation over explanation. Although comparative criminal justice usu-
ally borrows from or draws on other disciplines, it may sometimes 
become a privileged site for challenging them. It may seek to show that 
the penal state has transformed questions of social inequality, public 
policy and citizenship (Waquant, 2009a, 2009b), or that comparative 
criminology may have a better way of estimating the level of killing 
in Darfur than can be achieved by demographic and health-related 
approaches (Hagan and Wyland-Richmond, 2008). Finally, even fic-
tional accounts of detective work, trials etc. in books, films and other 
media may reveal valuable ‘truths’ about other places, often provid-
ing more complex and ambivalent accounts of the motivations and 
conduct of governments and legal actors than are found in the official 
sources on which textbooks or other accounts so often choose to rely.
Limits of space in a short book of this kind will not allow me to 
document all the progress that has already been made towards build-
ing the sort of comparative criminal justice being outlined here. But it 
should be noted that recent contributions increasingly take a broader 
and more critical approach to the field (e.g. Larsen and Smandych, 
2008; Drake, Muncie and Westmorland, 2010a and 2010b). On the 
other hand, challenging the assumptions of state-centred ‘adminis-
trative criminology’ (Young, 1988) does not in itself provide us with 
the tools or sensitivities to make sense of rather than impose our own 
expectations when explaining other peoples’ practices – and it is this 
which is the focus of this book. 
The social actors we are studying will not have all the answers to our 
problems (or their own). But whatever our objectives in studying crimi-
nal justice comparatively, we will not get far if we do not do all that is 
possible to make sure we have a fair grasp of what they think they are 
doing (as well as what they are actually achieving), and try to find out 
why it makes sense to them – to the extent it actually does so. If, on the 
other hand, our study of what is thought and happens in other places 
merely confirms what we already think is true and right (the need for more 
social inclusion, solidarity, tolerance, and respect for difference, for 
rational policy making and listening to the professionals, etc.), this will 
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often mean that we have projected our ideals and not given sufficient 
care to analysing all that may lie behind the practices we are studying. 
The problem is that learning how to avoid this is not easy given that 
our perceptions of others will always be coloured to some extent by our 
own cultural starting points. 
Policy-makers in the Netherlands, for example, tend to look for prag-
matic, practical, workable solutions to crime – just as they do when 
seeking to resolve other social problems. In Dutch cultural common 
sense, being pragmatic means not being dogmatic. But, in Italy, prag-
matic is often taken to suggest behaviour that is not guided by prin-
ciples, and that therefore borders on being unprincipled. Likewise, the 
idea of a ‘managerial’ approach to criminal justice is one that finds 
little favour, and is widely thought to be something that can potentially 
interfere with the proper functioning of legal procedures. This is not to 
say that Italians in everyday life are not often pragmatic, and the Dutch 
never principled. Far from it. The point is rather that it can be difficult 
to see the (culturally shaped) limits of a given way of seeing – and to 
realise, for example, that what we think of as being pragmatic may not 
actually be that sensible (Brownlie, 1998; Harcourt, 2006). If we insist 
that pragmatism must have its place, what is its place? If the question 
is when it is appropriate not to be pragmatic, a pragmatic approach may 
not be able to provide the answer we need.
Outline of book
In seeking to develop these claims further, the following chapters will 
illustrate their relevance to a number of fundamental issues in compar-
ative criminal justice. Chapter 1 asks why we do comparative research. 
In Chapter 2 I discuss what is involved in identifying similarities and 
differences. Chapter 3 examines possible approaches to doing com-
parative research, concentrating on the differences between explana-
tion and interpretation and the significance of culture. Chapter 4 takes 
as a case study of explanatory enquiries the debate over differences in 
prison rates in developed industrial countries. Chapter 5 then addresses 
the question of how far comparative criminal justice has to change at 
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a time of globalisation. Chapter 6 ends this introduction to the field by 
providing an account of the role of knowledge itself in the process of 
comparison. Though these issues are dealt with separately for ease of 
exposition, an important claim of this book is the need to appreciate 
how they are related; so there will be frequent cross-references. My aim 
will be less to take part in the various debates I review than to connect 
them to my overall theme. 
Continuity to the argument will also be provided by the use of 
examples drawn from the wide range of studies that seeks to con-
tribute to the subject of comparative criminal justice – as well as 
some that do not. But, in addition, I give special attention to illus-
trations based on my own empirical research into the workings of 
criminal justice in Italy, the country whose system I currently know 
best. As running case studies in each of the chapters, I make reference to 
three features of criminal justice in Italy that are puzzling, especially to 
those from an Anglo-American background (see Nelken, 2009b, 2010). 
The first of these comes from the realm of juvenile justice and has to do 
with explaining how it is possible that the majority of young Italians 
charged with murder not only do not go to prison but do not even 
receive a criminal conviction. What happens to these offenders? Why 
did this come about and why is nothing done about it? The second has 
to do with the so-called ‘myth of obligatory prosecution’, the fact that 
prosecutors are required – by the constitution itself – to take proceed-
ings in all cases for which there is evidence (if they do not do so, this 
is itself a violation). Is this principle really respected? How – and how 
far – is it possible to honour this obligation given the number of cases 
that are dealt with and the problems of prioritising cases? The final 
example focuses on the role of delays in Italian courts. What explains 
why cases take so long – often many years – to go through the various 
stages and procedures of the trial process? Why has nothing been done 
about this? Is such a system more or less favourable to the accused than 
one with effective ‘speedy trial’ protections?
In using these practices as my illustrations I am not suggesting that 
they are more important in themselves than the major events that 
have dominated Italian public life over the last twenty years that have 
all had, in some way, to do with ‘law and order’: the series of corrup-
tion investigations known as Tangentopoli, the vicissitudes of the fight 
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against the mafia and other organised crime groups, the criminalisation of 
immigrants, or Berlusconi’s personal battles with the judges. Certainly, 
it is only by placing them in context that these practices can be made 
to seem less strange. But I would insist that giving attention to crimi-
nal justice procedures is essential to understanding the shape of such 
struggles – and sometimes what the struggle is about. And, in terms 
of comparative enquiry in this field more generally, these case stud-
ies allow me to offer a different, and dissenting, perspective on claims 
about the overall rise of the so-called Penal State that dominate much 
of the English-language literature. 
This said, giving so much attention to Italy, a European, economi-
cally developed country with a continental legal system (though one 
considerably modified as far as criminal justice is concerned) certainly 
limits the kind of topics in comparative criminal justice I am able to 
consider. Starting from the experience of the workings of criminal jus-
tice in, for example, China, Middle Eastern Islamic countries, or focus-
ing on African forms of dispute resolution, could illuminate different 
issues – even if it might also obscure others. The textbooks try to cover 
the larger canvas, and if it could be done well, there would be much to 
be said for this. But it would be inconsistent with the argument of this 
book for me to pretend expertise about places that I have never even 
visited. As I shall argue repeatedly, there is no ‘view from nowhere’, and 
no ‘global’ or ‘world view’, even if there can be less, or more, parochial 
perspectives. Hopefully, though, at least some of the theoretical and 
methodological points that emerge in discussing Italy and the other 
places touched on may also be applicable in examining criminal justice 
practices elsewhere.
One
why compare?
It may be easy enough to find striking examples of differences in criminal 
justice, but what is less clear is how these can contribute to make up a 
coherent subject matter. What is the comparative analysis of criminal 
justice (good) for? In this chapter I first describe some of the theoretical 
and policy goals of this subject and how the literature seeks to con-
tribute to them. I then go on to discuss how far this sort of work can 
overcome the risks of ethnocentrism and relativism.
The goals of comparative criminal justice
There are a variety of theoretical and practical reasons for wanting to 
know more about what others do about the sanctioning of offensive 
conduct (Nelken, 1994b, 2002). Whatever misgivings they may have 
about how their own system works, many people are even more suspi-
cious of what goes on when their fellow citizens end up being tried 
in courts abroad. Such ethnocentric thinking can easily lead people to 
assume a priori that their own local arrangements must be superior in 
general, or at the very least better fitted to their own society. But, fortu-
nately, there are also those who have a more open-minded interest in 
apparently strange ideas and practices, seeking to make sense of rather 
than reject difference outright.
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Many writers seek to learn from other systems how to improve their 
own. Hence we get articles with titles like ‘English criminal justice: is 
it better than ours?’ (Hughes, 1984), or ‘Comparative criminal justice as 
a guide to American law reform: how the French do it, how can we 
find out and why should we care?’ (Frase, 1990). Those who undertake 
studies of this kind seek to borrow an institution, practice, technique, 
idea or slogan so as to better realise their own values, or sometimes to 
change them. They may aim to learn from those places with high incar-
ceration rates what not to do, or they may seek to help others change 
their systems, for example exporting new police systems to South Africa, 
or restoring the jury system in Russia. Or again they may just be con-
cerned to cooperate and collaborate in the face of ‘common threats’. 
But the practical importance of this subject brings us up against one 
of the most troubling of questions regarding the goals of our compari-
sons. How far are we intending to learn more about our own system 
and its problems, and how far are we trying to understand another 
place, system or practice ‘for itself’? For some authors, we can choose 
between seeking for ‘provincial’ or ‘international’ insights, or engag-
ing in ‘national’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ enquiries (Reichel, 2008; Zimring, 
2006). For reform purposes, comparative researchers deliberately use 
accounts of practices elsewhere as a foil. Lacey (2008), for example, 
deploys evidence of differences in prison rates in Europe so as to prove 
that growing punitiveness is not the only game in town and suggest to 
UK politicians that they can find a way out of outbidding each other on 
being ‘tough on crime’. In other cases, we may set out to understand 
the other but end up knowing ourselves. As T.S. Eliot (1943) put it:
the end of our exploring,
Will be to arrive where we started,
And know the place for the first time.
What, on the other hand, could it mean to try to understand another 
society only in ‘its own terms’? Even the society being reported on 
is likely to understand itself in relation to points of similarity and dif-
ference in relation to some places (those to which it compares itself) 
rather than others. To a large extent it is impossible to make sense 
of things except against some background of previous expecta-
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tions. Someone from India will find Italian criminal justice relatively 
efficient; someone from Denmark is unlikely to do so. Any cross- 
cultural comparison emerges from a given cultural context and has to 
be able to make sense to the audience(s) for whom it is intended. What 
is found interesting or puzzling will vary depending on local salience. 
But even questions couched in terms that are salient in both (or more) 
cultures being compared will lead to different answers depending on 
which culture one starts from. Reichel (2008) begins his book with the 
dilemma faced by US police agents, who feel justified to continue to 
pursue a criminal who has fled to Mexico because the police there are 
notoriously corrupt. He admits that the Mexican government might 
feel differently about such conduct. But one would imagine a rather 
different take on the topic in a textbook written for Mexican students. 
Should we then say that what is crucial in studying another place 
is less whether the author has actually got it ‘right’ and more what the 
author makes of it? Balvig, for example (1988), tells us that his aim was 
less to learn about somewhere else than to understand his own coun-
try better. Perhaps this is all that ‘learning’ from others means (and can 
mean)? Does it even matter if, according to Johnson (2001), Braithwaite 
may not have properly grasped the Japanese criminal justice practices 
he used as a model for his highly influential idea of ‘reintegrative sham-
ing’ (Braithwaite, 1989)? Taken too far, however, this line of argument 
becomes self-defeating. The reasons we make comparisons cannot pro-
vide the only criterion of success. If we have failed to properly understand 
another system we can hardly make use of ‘it’ to throw light on our own 
arrangements. Even if there is no view from nowhere, this does not prove 
that all starting points are of equal value. And seeing only what is useful 
for us is a poor way of acknowledging and engaging with the ‘other’.
We also have to ask what, if anything, is specific about this subject. 
It has been forcefully pointed out that all social science is concerned 
with explaining variation and difference (Feeley, 1997). Comparison 
was central to the work of both Durkheim and Weber, albeit with rather 
different strategies. Many would say that comparison is the essence of 
all social enquiries or even of logical enquiry in general. In principle, 
then, no line can or needs to be drawn between criminal justice and 
comparative criminal justice (or between criminology and compara-
tive criminology). In addition, the traditional focus of what is called 
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comparative criminal justice on different national jurisdictions is mainly 
a matter of political/legal convention and methodological convenience. 
There are considerable political, social and cultural differences within 
modern nation-states, for example within the USA (Newburn, 2006), 
or Australia (Brown, 2005), and even more so in less industrialised socie-
ties. For some purposes other ‘units’, such as towns, organisations and 
professional groups, can all provide occasions for comparison. And tran-
snational crime activities and responses to them help transform and 
transcend differences between units defined as nation-states. 
The local, the national and the international often interpenetrate. But 
there may sometimes be good reasons to privilege the nation-state or soci-
etal level. States are the locus both for collecting criminal statistics and for 
administration, and their boundaries often, though not always, coincide 
with contrasts in language and culture. Franklin Zimring, a distinguished 
American criminologist, explains that he became a ‘convert’ to compara-
tive criminology when discovering that Canada had not shared the rise 
in US prison levels even though its crime rate was not much lower than 
in the USA, with the exception of homicide and life-threatening robbery 
(Zimring, 2006). As this example also shows, some of criminology’s major 
debates now involve issues of comparative criminal justice. 
Cross-national and cross-cultural research is a fundamental way to 
show whether criminology’s claims are more than local truths (though 
it does not exhaust this task, in so far as taken-for-granted starting points 
are also conditioned by other factors, for example gender). But this 
subject offers a number of other potential benefits (and challenges) that 
go beyond simply adding to the pool of potential variables that can be 
used in building criminological explanations. Trying to understand one 
place in the light of another allows us to move closer to a holistic pic-
ture of how crime and its control are connected (what do they know of 
England who only England know?). For example, it may help us under-
stand the factors that explain why a given society goes through cycles 
of corruption and anti-corruption. Likewise, it can help us appreciate 
why reforms that are limited to those that emerge from within the same 
society often tend to reproduce the problems they are being asked to 
solve – precisely because they come from the same culture.
In England and Wales, as in the Netherlands, the answer to failures 
in the system is normally thought to be greater efficiency and speed 
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(as in reforms of the English Youth Justice system inspired by the reports 
of the Audit Commission). In Italy, a rethinking or defence of ‘values’ 
is more often invoked as the way forward when problems arise (thus 
the ‘obligatoriness’ of prosecution decision-making is usually argued 
about as an issue of principle rather than as a question of learning 
from the ‘best practices’ of prosecutors as they struggle to deal with 
this demanding requirement (Nelken and Zanier, 2006)). ‘Governing 
through crime’ may be a particularly American obsession, but suggest-
ing that it be replaced with the metaphor of the fight against cancer still 
remains firmly within the American ethos of instrumental problem-
solving (Simon, 2007). Miscarriages of justice arise both in more adver-
sarial and more inquisitorial types of process. But in each case it is their 
tendency to count too much on the strengths of their procedures that 
danger lies (Brants, 2010). 
Comparative study can help us escape from such self-sealing cultural 
logics (Field and Nelken, 2007). There are a variety of strategies that can 
be used. But each is also subject to pitfalls. Classifications can be contro-
versial, descriptions deceptive, explanations erroneous, interpretations 
interminable, translations twisted, and evaluations ethnocentric. The 
difficulties multiply in so far as a satisfactory account of difference usu-
ally requires the ability to draw on more than one of these strategies. 
But the message of this book is that considerable progress can be made 
in understanding and explaining other systems of criminal justice if 
(but only if) we face up to these challenges. 
Collecting data on legal rules, procedures and distinctive institutions 
is certainly a valuable first step (one that is both demanding and time-
consuming, not least because of linguistic and conceptual difficulties). It 
can be instructive to learn about the social role of policemen in Japan (as 
well as the lesser known system of voluntary probation officers), or dis-
cover that the way chosen to stop traffic policeman in Mexico City taking 
bribes from motorists was to appoint less threatening women rather than 
men to do this job. Careful description can also help get beyond often 
out-of-date classificatory stereotypes. In many respects, the Netherlands 
has more similarities with the UK than with Italy, even though the UK 
has a common law rather than continental system of criminal justice. 
But the task of comparativists, unlike that of lawyers, cannot be that of 
providing description for description sake. Even the effort to describe 
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selected aspects of criminal procedure in Europe runs to over a thousand 
pages (Delmas-Marty and Spencer, 2002). 
Descriptions can provide the basis for explanation and understanding, 
but for them to serve this purpose we must have an understanding of the 
way the ‘law in action’ relates to the ‘law in books’. This essential work-
ing tool for all social studies of the law was in fact first put forward in the 
context of studying police (mis)use of criminal procedure. Likewise, the 
distance between what continental systems of criminal justice claimed to 
be doing and what research into the law in action showed they were actu-
ally doing was the nub of the classical debate about ‘the myth of judicial 
supervision’ in continental criminal procedure (Goldstein and Marcus, 
1977). The leading recent empirical in-depth study of French criminal 
justice, by Jacqueline Hodgson, also places stress on how little actual 
supervision of police is exercised by continental prosecutors (Hodgson, 
2005). On the other hand, if we are worried that some criminal justice 
systems allow the state to use psychological pressure against defendants 
(Vogler, 2005), a closer look at what goes on in police cars will quickly 
show us that this is not a problem restricted to the inquisitorial system.
Empirical research has shown that it was rarely necessary to pass ‘tel-
ephone justice’ messages to judges and prosecutors to ensure politically 
appropriate outcomes of trials in communist East Germany. The meth-
ods used to appoint and socialise recruits to these offices was sufficient 
(Markovits, 1995). More recently, by contrast, corruption investigations in 
post-communist Poland were themselves used ‘corruptly’ against political 
adversaries under direct government impetus (Polak and Nelken, 2010). 
As this suggests, rules and safeguards can even operate in ways that are the 
opposite of what are said to be their justifications. The procedures in Italy 
that are supposed to protect offenders’ rights to know as soon as possible 
that they are being prosecuted (the avviso di garanzie notice) ends up hav-
ing the effect of facilitating ‘trial by media’ (Nelken and Maneri, 2000). 
Paying attention to the ‘law in action’ is also relevant to making sense 
of all three of the running examples being used in this book. The reason 
why young people in Italy, in some respects, ‘get away with murder’ is 
that the 1989 reform of juvenile justice was a procedural one brought 
in at the same time as the introduction of the major procedural reform 
in that year for adults. It did not change the substantive penalties on 
conviction available for serious offences by young people, which remain 
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(in this country where children are so much loved) only prison. The two 
most important new measures that were introduced – ‘irrelevance’, for 
cases that were deemed too trivial for further prosecution (an essential 
filter in a regime of obligatory prosecution and one not yet available for 
adults), and ‘putting to the test’ (messa alla prova), a type of probation 
with in-built requirements of work, schooling etc. – had therefore to be 
pre-trial procedures – ways of putting off and avoiding trial. It is because 
messa all prova is available for all crimes that prosecutions for murder 
often end up without going to trial provided the conditions of pre-
trial probation measures have been successfully met. 
Likewise, to make sense of obligatory prosecution, it is necessary to 
learn how Italian prosecutors actually behave, given the impossibility 
for handling all the cases on their desk simultaneously. Who or what 
is it that de facto decides priorities – the prosecution office or the single 
prosecutor – and on what grounds? The rule of obligatory prosecution 
can in practice strengthen the hands of prosecutors who give priority 
to some classes of cases rather than others (Nelken, 1997b; Nelken and 
Zanier, 2006). Finally, to understand the times taken by trials, it is vital 
to appreciate the workings of the system’s own cut-off points for undue 
procedural delay. This so-called period of prescription, within which a 
case must run its course, applies right up until the hearing of appeal 
in the final court, after three stages of trial and any number of possible 
procedural objections. So defence lawyers often try less to prove their 
client’s innocence than to make the case overrun it’s allocated time. 
For many criminologists, the main interest of comparative criminal 
justice lies in the help it affords for formulating and testing explanatory 
hypotheses about levels of incarceration rates, the retention of the death 
penalty, or whatever. Those looking for explanations of differences in 
criminal justice practices that translate quickly into policy arguments 
may be disappointed, however. Asking which penal disposal is better at 
reducing crime turns out to be more complicated than ever when asked 
across a range of countries, many of whose criminal justice systems seem to 
give low priority to this goal. We first have to understand why that should 
be the case. It has been argued that even countries like the USA, which 
claim to be most concerned with reducing recidivism, are less concerned 
with crime in its own right than with larger issues of social and moral 
discipline (Simon, 2007). And critics of penal policies may likewise be 
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as interested in wider questions of how to create a better society as they 
are in crime rates as such. In this field explanatory and evaluative issues, 
what works and what is right, are rarely easily separated.
Those with a normative agenda may seek to assess criminal justice 
systems as a whole. Is the problem that too many people are being sent 
to prison, or too few, or does all depend on which offenders we are 
speaking about? There are also interesting differences between criminal 
justice systems in what kind of evaluation, if any, is seen as appropri-
ate for different actors in the system. Should judges be evaluated, by 
whom, for what conduct, and for what purpose? (Mohr and Contini, 
2008). More commonly, commentators examine what goes on at a given 
‘stage’ of criminal justice, or in one of its constituent organisations or 
networks. But because criminal justice practices are sites for contesting 
values, in order to make sense of what criminal justice agents are trying 
to do, we need to make sense of their normative commitments and will 
often be providing contestable interpretations of their behaviour. 
In Anglo-American systems, for example, it is debatable and debated 
when plea bargains are to be considered the result of unfair pressures. 
Getting our normative bearings can be even more difficult in unfamiliar 
contexts. In Italy, some judges in corruption cases imprison those who 
refuse to confess, arguing that extracting a confession is the only certain 
way they have of being sure that the offender will no longer be trusted 
by his associates (and so be unable to repeat the offence). But many 
commentators see this as an abuse of criminal procedure. Should ‘we’ 
take one side or the other (and who are ‘we’)? How much allowance 
should be made for the larger context of political corruption in which 
judges find themselves, or for particular historical circumstances such as 
those that characterised the Tangentopoli anti-corruption investigations 
(Nelken, 1996, 1997b)?
Beyond ethnocentrism and relativism? 
To make progress both in learning about and evaluating other systems 
of criminal justice we need to bear in mind two dangers. On the one 
hand, there is the risk of being ethnocentric – of ‘confusing the familiar 
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with the necessary’. Here we fall into the trap of assuming that the links 
between social factors, crime and criminal justice that we find persua-
sive are also ones that apply generally, and that what we do, our way 
of thinking about and responding to crime, is universally shared, or, 
at least, that it would be right for everyone else. Alternatively, there is 
the temptation of relativism. Here the claim is that we can never really 
grasp what others are doing, or that there can be no transcultural basis 
for evaluating whether what they, or we, do is right (see, for example, 
Beirne, 1983/1997; Leavitt, 1990/1997; Cain, 2000b; and Sheptycki and 
Wardak, 2005). 
For some leading post-war authors the point of comparative work 
was precisely so as to ‘uncover etiologic universals operative as causal 
agents irrespective of cultural differences between different countries’ 
(Szabo, 1975: 367). The search for such generalisations continues. 
Authors seek to show that certain social groups or categories tend to 
be more punitive than others, or that similar forms of criminal con-
duct are, as a matter of fact, universally disapproved to similar degrees. 
Claims are made that, cross-culturally, people have similar preferences 
for fair trial processes and shared intuitions about how institutions such 
as the police must behave if they are to be considered legitimate (Lind 
and Tyler, 1988). A well-organised criminal justice state that reflects 
such public preferences is seen as the best way of helping victims of 
criminal behaviour (Newman, 1999).
The currently renewed interest in establishing and spreading 
‘evidence-based’, transcultural knowledge of ‘what works’ in respond-
ing to crime (Sherman et al., 1997) is an important example of the 
search for universalistic knowledge in this field. On the one hand, 
this represents a valuable attempt to reverse the unwarranted, and 
partially unintended, pessimism induced by the earlier slogan that 
‘nothing works’ in terms of dealing with offenders. But this type of 
‘globalising criminology’ can also be less culture-free than it pur-
ports to be (Nelken, 2003a). Strengthening dysfunctional families 
is seen as the major route to reducing crime. Yet Mafia groups, like 
those of corrupt politicians and all groups of collaborative crimi-
nals, seem, if anything, to suffer from having too strong family or 
family-like ties. This approach also often gives insufficient attention 
to what different cultures mean by ‘working’ (especially in reference 
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to the procedures of criminal justice), as well as for whom it is that 
crime prevention and criminal justice is supposed to work. 
By contrast, there are authors who contest this search for universals 
and suggest the point of comparative research is rather to undermine the 
pretensions of positivistic criminology. For them, careful examination of 
foreign criminal justice practices suggests that it is, above all, the certain-
ties buried in universalising approaches to explanation, such as the claim 
that all systems find ways of relieving caseload pressures, or that criminal 
law must always serve the interests of the powerful, that turn out to be 
cultural rather than scientific truisms. Differences between what societies 
define and treat as crime can be striking – and not only in the obvious 
areas of political and sexual deviance. The USA is still sending people to 
their death in the electric chair, but, in 2008, a fairground owner in Italy 
was convicted of a crime against public decency for exhibiting a pretend 
one! The same applies to solutions to deviance. Writers in the UK are 
convinced that military-style policing always alienates police from the 
community and so cuts down the supply of information. But in Italy 
the fact that the militarised carabinieri live in barracks apart from society 
is seen as a guarantee of their independence from potentially corrupt-
ing local ties. This is especially important in the South where organised 
crime groups hold so much sway.
Deciding what is ethnocentric or relativistic is not always straight-
forward. It is, of course, not ethnocentric to have value preferences – 
only somewhat suspect if these simply coincide with those we have 
been brought up to believe in. Thus American textbooks tend to warn of 
the price that countries such as Saudi Arabia or Japan pay for their low 
crime or low prison rates. Yes, Saudi Arabia has less crime, but ‘we’ would 
not want to have as little ‘freedom’ as they do. It is true that Japan has 
low levels of incarceration but some of the things the Japanese do in 
their criminal process to make this possible we would not find accept-
able, and, more generally, ‘their ‘conformist way of living is not for us 
(Dammer, Fairchild and Albanese, 2005: 9). 
It is moot whether we can use Anglo-American categories, such as 
‘due process’ versus ‘crime control’ (Packer, 1964), or speak of ‘justice’ 
versus ‘welfare’, as if they referred to universal predicaments. A surprising 
example of what can be seen as an ethnocentric approach is provided by 
the great criminologist Edwin Lemert, one of the inventors of the social 
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reaction and labelling approach, and also a specialist in juvenile justice. 
In a widely reproduced paper about the Italian system, Lemert noted the 
enormous disproportion between the number of juveniles arrested and 
processed in the USA and in Italy. But, rather than see this as an indict-
ment of the American approach, he argued that the Italian system was 
what he called a ‘spurious’ example of juvenile justice because it could 
not be seriously considered as trying to implement a welfare system for 
juveniles on the American model (Lemert, 1986). As it turned out, it 
was the USA that moved away from the welfare model that the Italian 
system has been steadily consolidating (Krisberg, 2006). 
An emphasis on the importance of diversity and the particular is 
not the same as relativism (Dembour, 2006). Different arrangements 
may indeed – rightly – be appropriate under different conditions, and 
changing conditions may also alter the relevance over time of given 
values even within the same culture. Roach, for example, argues that 
the rise of victims’ groups challenges the continued utility of Packer’s 
categories, even in Anglo-American settings, by showing that these were 
focused only on the roles of the state and the accused (Roach, 1998). 
Even if some practices work well locally, they may not be easily transfer-
able. It is hard to imagine other places copying the Japanese in seeking 
to reform a rapist by telling him to write a haiku (Johnson, 2000). But 
their wider applicability should not be confused with understanding 
how they work as they do in loco. If the question was how the conti-
nental methods of control over the police would work in the USA, then 
Goldstein and Marcus were right that such methods would be insuffi-
cient to avoid potential abuse (Goldstein and Marcus, 1977). But, in so 
far as the issue was rather trying to understand what other places were 
actually trying to do, and sometimes succeeding in doing, in the context 
of their own structures and expectations, then Langbein and Weinreb had 
the better of the argument (Langbein and Weinreb, 1978).
Conversely, if we wish to avoid ethnocentrism, it is not sufficient 
to be critical of our own practices. This too can be formulated in ways 
that take for granted local values which are then projected on ‘better’ 
systems elsewhere (e.g. Pizzi, 1999). It is often helpful to ask whether 
we may have fallen into the so-called ‘evil causes evil fallacy’ (Cohen, 
1970). Just as it can be a mistake to assume that the causes of crime 
must necessarily be other objectionable matters, we need to be open 
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to the possibility that aspects of criminal justice that we disapprove of 
may be connected to positive and not only negative factors (and vice 
versa for matters we approve of). Criminologists who try to explain 
which states in the USA have the highest prison rates tend to single 
out factors that most criminologists would consider negative in their 
own right, such as lower welfare levels, less effort to ensure economic 
equality, and less public participation in political life, or the power of 
only certain groups to participate where it matters. But this can also be 
linked to the rise in concern for victims, or the introduction of deter-
minate sentencing through sentencing guidelines. To a limited extent 
even the effort to abolish or limit the use of the death penalty can 
increase the use of prison (Gottschalk, 2006). Prison building restarted 
in the Netherlands in part so as not to abandon the principle of one 
person to a cell. It has been suggested that egalitarianism in the USA 
led to an increase rather than a reduction in levels of state punishment 
(Whitman, 2003; Nelken, 2006e).
More individualist and more collective societies can each have their 
own sort of pathologies, for example dealing with difference by exclud-
ing it or by enforced assimilation (Young, 1999). Assuming that places 
with lower prison rates necessarily operate more ‘inclusive’ systems of 
social justice can be the kind of short-cut that can easily lead to a dead 
end. Learning from what others do is not so straightforward. On closer 
acquaintance we may well find that we like the result achieved by other 
systems of criminal justice, but not the means they use to get there, or 
vice versa. (In Italy it is the politicians’ sense of their vulnerability to 
criminal prosecution that helps explains why criminal procedure is so 
complicated, and hence why less people end up in prison than might 
otherwise do so).
The need to give attention to the local and the particular does not 
mean that we cannot ever talk about ‘best practice’, as evaluated accord-
ing to widely shared standards. Even if considerable caution needs to 
be used in interpreting cross-national ratings, some places may be 
doing better or worse in terms of such standards. If one in ten children 
in Denmark who grow up in local government care homes go on to 
further education, whereas in the UK only one in a hundred do so, 
then we would do well to try to learn how this is achieved. But com-
parative research should not be treated only as a means of identifying 
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universally valid best practices to be adopted wholesale. We can also 
explore what happens elsewhere so as to engage in ‘internal critique’ 
according to our own standards. Those in common law systems could 
learn that paying more attention to ‘due process’ considerations could 
also help achieve the goal of ‘crime control’ (by increasing legitimacy, 
public confidence and cooperation). Conversely, French authors could 
discover that strengthening the role of defence lawyers in their system 
could help increase the chances of truth emerging from the process – a 
key value for them. 
What this implies is that the best practice for ‘us’ to learn from may not 
always be best practice as such, but rather that which stretches our imagi-
nation about what is possible. Moving a little nearer to what we would 
otherwise never normally think of doing may be just what is needed. 
It may seem obvious to many observers of Italy (as well as to some 
Italians) that the Italian criminal justice system could benefit from 
increased pragmatism and managerialism. But vice versa, Italy may 
have something important to teach more pragmatic countries about 
the possible counter-productive consequences of too much concern for 
‘efficiency’ in their penal systems.
Take the three running examples being used in this book. The Italian 
juvenile system may seem to offer insufficiently robust procedures for 
dealing with the type of problem situations that Anglo-American sys-
tems face. But, in England and Wales, the government’s recent stress on 
dealing with caseloads more expeditiously mainly led to a substantial 
rise in youth custody, in contradiction to its general commitment to 
reduce this number. As far as the rule of obligatory prosecution is con-
cerned, it is not obvious that those who want to bring about a more 
equal society can or should immediately seek to achieve this by opting 
for the Italian rule of mandatory prosecution. Even the Italian system 
achieved the effects it did only during an exceptional period of political 
transition, though it is also fair to add that the judges themselves played 
an important part in bringing about that transition. Under ‘normal’ cir-
cumstances, the degree of independence possessed by Italian prosecutors 
can lead to continual and distracting tests of strength with governments, 
which weakens collaboration in organising much needed reforms of the 
criminal process. Nonetheless there may be much to be learned – for 
countries where prosecution is less independent – about the different 
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possible meanings of prosecutorial independence, and the social and 
political preconditions and consequences of such independence. 
The example of Italian trials raises even more issues. Certainly, justice 
delayed may often simply be justice denied. Delay reduces the chance 
of conviction because of its implications for the witnesses’ memories, 
willingness to collaborate, vulnerability to being got at, etc. Once it has 
accumulated, delay itself produces more delay and uncertainty, and, 
because final trial verdicts are so slow in coming, Italy is increasingly 
experiencing trial by media as the daily newspapers treat even informa-
tion about the earliest stage of an investigation as a token of presumed 
guilt. But, in so far as delay is produced by given rules of criminal pro-
cedure, this should lead us to think more carefully what ‘due process’ 
(what the Italians call garanzie) should actually require. How many 
stages of appeal should there be? How much need is there for separate 
scrutiny at each stage by different judges (and how appropriate is it 
to restrict all such decisions to legally trained people)? Why is it not 
enough to trust to the system’s own internal legal definition of when 
cases have overrun the time in which they must be disposed of? 
We can even ask whether slowness can ever have value. At a confer-
ence in Padua on the topic of legal delay in which I participated, it was 
surmised that delayed trials could give victims time to get over their 
upset so as not be so emotional. This may seem less strange a sugges-
tion if we treat criminal justice, as one important progressive Italian 
theorist does, as primarily a means to restrain vendetta in the interest 
of the offender (Ferrajoli, 1989; Nelken 1993). This is certainly a very 
different perspective from the current trend to make the victim and his 
and her feelings play a more central role. Criminal justice also reflects 
wider social values. A more efficient or speedy court system in Italy 
would often come into conflict with a social structure and culture in 
which many people place reliance on slowly built-up forms of group 
co-optation and clientalist sponsorship, sometimes even in defiance of 
legal rules. On a more positive note, Italy has been called the spiritual 
home of the slowness movement, the call to all of us to slow down so 
as to get more out of life (Honoré, 2004). Perhaps slow food and fast 
trials are incompatible?
TWO
just comparison
What makes for a fair comparison? Where do and should we start from 
in making comparisons? Should we be looking for similarities or for 
differences? What do we mean by comparing like with like? The answer 
to these questions depends in large part on the point of the exercise, 
on what is being compared, and on why. Hence the discussion in this 
chapter is connected to all the others in this book. The main point I 
seek to make here, however, is that difficulties in finding answers to 
these questions should be seen less as practical obstacles to be got over 
or got round and more as clues to understanding difference. 
Starting points
Where we begin is all-important in any comparison. It is too easy just 
to fasten on differences in national statistics about criminal justice and 
then seek to explain them. Too often, however, this means we presup-
pose rather than learn how to change our intellectual coordinates. To 
do this we need to seek out puzzles and then make sense of them. But 
enigmas do not exist in the abstract; they emerge when relating what 
is considered salient in the place concerned – its own starting points in 
thinking about crime and criminal justice – to what is salient for the 
investigator. Once, when I remarked impatiently that a particularly con-
voluted bureaucratic requirement in Italy was ‘Kafka-like’, a colleague 
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replied sharply ‘It’s Kafka to you!’ (But perhaps that is also what the 
good citizens of Prague may have said to Kafka?).
There certainly are criminal justice practices that can be considered 
strange even in supposedly more pragmatic cultures. What sense is 
there in allowing, as the Dutch do, the retail sale of marihuana to cus-
tomers in ‘coffee-houses’ while continuing to prohibit the wholesale 
supply of it to the same places at the back door? How would Americans 
explain to foreign observers that one Reagan appointee to the Federal 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention carried a bumper 
sticker on his car reading ‘Have you slugged your kid today’ (Krisberg, 
2006: 8). The UK government allows shopping malls to deter unwanted 
bands of young people by using ‘mosquito’ machines that emit annoy-
ing sounds that can only be heard by youngsters; the not always as 
effective alternative, apparently, being to play popular music records 
from the 1950s (Crawford, 2010). That these last two examples both 
have to do with young people is not happenstance.
The point is that unless we can somehow get a grasp on the ways our 
cultural assumptions shape our comparative projects we are unlikely to 
make progress in understanding another society. For example, as com-
pared to socio-economic factors, the role of religion and the family cur-
rently finds little space in many cross-national explanations of prison 
rates. But this may have mainly to do with the socio-cultural starting 
point of those doing the comparing. What are considered problems 
and solutions varies from place to place, and from time to time. Zedner 
reports that she had difficulty in convincing colleagues at Chicago dur-
ing a visit there that gun-carrying by teenagers was not in fact the pre-
eminent problem of crime-control everywhere (Zedner, 2003: 167). If 
we keep reading about corruption in Italy and less so in the UK (at least 
until recently) this could be not only because there actually is more cor-
ruption in Italy but also because it is more salient there (Eve, 1996). 
Starting points also shape what are seen as appropriate solutions. To 
a large extent, in Anglo-American countries (as Continental Europeans 
refer to them) a solution is widely considered right because it ‘works’. 
But, in the less policy-dominated discourse in Italy and some other con-
tinental countries, it would be as true to say that, for many commenta-
tors, a response ‘works’ because it is ‘right’, and less attention is given to 
what actually happens as opposed to what ought to happen.
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In Italy, until recently, it was common for the victim (or relatives of 
victims) of horrendous crimes to be asked by journalists if they were 
willing to forgive the offender (rather than being enlisted by politicians 
or journalists so as to show the need for greater severity). But things 
change. For one leading author writing about Italy in the 1990s, the 
concern was less about ‘governing through crime’ (Simon, 2007) than 
‘ruling through leniency’ (Melossi, 1994), as shown in the willingness 
of governments to rule without contesting the power of organised crime 
groups. But, even in Italy, campaigns against crime by immigrants have 
become an excuse for giving more attention to ‘victims’ (usually ignor-
ing the relatively high proportion of immigrants who end up as victims 
of serious crimes). Melossi himself now focuses his work less on leni-
ency than on the serious problem of the criminalisation of immigrants. 
If Zedner’s colleagues from Chicago had visited London in the sum-
mer of 2008 they would have found considerable concern over deaths 
caused by knife-carrying youngsters.
These points about structures of relevance have important implica-
tions for projects involving collaboration between experts in a vari-
ous countries. Sometimes the hope is that important cross-national 
similarities and differences will emerge from detailed descriptions of 
what goes on in different places. Michael Tonry, for instance, assem-
bled leading scholars to describe what was happening to crime and 
punishment in their respective countries (Tonry, 2007b). Junger-Tas 
and Decker (2006) collected reports from a large range of experts more 
specifically on developments in juvenile justice. At other times editors 
explicitly invite their contributors to address a common issue. Thus 
Pratt et al. (2005) and Muncie and Goldson (2006) ask their contribu-
tors to focus on the issue of where the countries and systems they are 
describing stand on the issue of growing punitiveness. Alternatively, 
a more elaborated hypothesis may be put forward for testing cross-
nationally. In their study of police integrity, Klockars, Ivkovich and 
Haberfeld (2004) standardised a survey instrument to be administered 
to police organisations in a variety of countries. This was intended 
to measure the extent to which reported expectations about possible 
internal sanctions likely to be forthcoming from the organisation were 
correlated with reports of the frequency of inappropriate behaviour 
actually taking place. 
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There is much to be learned from these books. But, while the 
chapters are often of high value in their own right as guides to local 
developments, what emerges is often only of tangential relevance to 
cross-national generalisations. Junger-Tas and Decker’s main finding, 
for example, says little more than that there are consistent differences 
between what has been happening in Anglo-American and Continental 
European jurisdictions. Contributors to these types of collective work 
are themselves often caught in a dilemma of how far to tell us all about 
their own country in terms of local concerns and how far to follow the 
editor’s guidelines and refer to the common trend or hypothesis. The 
best way to explain what is happening locally may be neither in terms 
of the system following a common trend nor in terms of it resisting it 
(see e.g. Nelken, 2005). 
As far as testing hypotheses is concerned, it is not easy to move 
between the general and the particular. Klockars, Ivkovich and Haberfeld 
were searching mainly for cross-national and cross-cultural explanatory 
‘universals’ about the relationship between organisational culture, 
police misbehaviour and the responses to it. They claimed to show 
that police officers in general agreed about the relative seriousness of 
forms of police misconduct, but their survey instrument was particularly 
apt for the decentralised USA, where different police agencies vary enor-
mously in how far they tolerate police misconduct. However, the authors 
of the Swedish contribution paid little attention to local variation, and 
much more to that between the sexes. For them, the problem of public 
police running private security businesses had a symbolic importance 
that was not necessarily generalisable. More radical still, the survey of 
Japanese police showed an impressive level of integrity. But the author 
cautioned that this could be due to the cultural norms that oblige the 
police in Japan to reply to enquiries in certain ways, and suggested that 
the real problems of police integrity lay at the top, in particular in police 
collusion with gambling and organised crime.
The question of salience is also linked to the units that we do or 
should use as the reference points of our comparisons. The assumption 
is that some places are more important than others for the contribution 
they can provide in clarifying issues in comparative criminal justice. 
Many textbooks talk, for example, about model nations, prototypes, 
archetypes, etc. (Pakes, 2004; Dammer, Fairchild and Albanese, 2005). 
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But the choice of which nations to discuss seems somewhat haphazard. 
Some places, such as Japan, Switzerland and Saudi Arabia, have lent 
themselves to be used as exemplars of large possible differences in crime 
rates or prison rates. Among Western industrialised countries the USA 
is, in some respects, the most exceptional country (not only for the size 
of its prison population, but also in the centrality of criminal justice 
as a form of social control). But, given that it is the place where most 
textbooks are written, much writing about criminal justice assumes it as 
a background, and its approaches often spread by imitation elsewhere. 
By contrast, some other countries, such as the allegedly more ‘inclusive’ 
and tolerant Scandinavia countries, are currently idealised because of 
their relatively low incarceration rates. But such places are much more 
complicated when taken in their own terms and not only treated as 
exemplars of leniency. Thus Finland is strongly committed to repress 
drug dealing, and Sweden to cutting down prostitution. 
The units of comparison to which scholars refer tend, mainly for rea-
sons of convenience, to be nation-states, although categories taken from 
comparative law are also common. More imaginative comparisons use 
units which reflect differences in religious affiliation, between ‘guilt’ and 
‘shame’ societies, or ideas about ‘high-context’ and ‘low-context’ cultures, 
and so on. In addition to comparing states or societies, some authors com-
pare sub-units, subcultures, organisations and even actors within crimi-
nal justice systems. So-called ‘epistemic communities’ (Karstedt, 2002) of 
regulators or scholars also represent possible units for comparison. 
It is not always clear when we should favour multi-sited research 
as compared to single case studies. (Even studying a single society 
counts as a comparative study if it is being conducted as an implicit 
comparison with one or more other societies.) Zimring distinguishes 
between what he calls ‘distributional’ and ‘contextual’ comparative 
work (Zimring, 2006). To see variations across places, he claims, is useful 
if we are dealing with Italy, but essential if we are studying Belgium. On 
the other hand, a focus just on the USA, he argues, can be justified so as 
to isolate what is special about it. But we could also say that, depending 
on our purposes, even smaller jurisdictions could sometimes need to be 
studied contextually. What is clear is that the larger the number of soci-
eties being compared, the more difficult it will be to formulate variables 
that are salient cross-culturally. On the other hand when only a limited 
 comparative criminal justice30
number of places are compared, it is possible to be misled by missing 
the larger picture. Some early comparisons between the American and 
Japanese criminal justice systems left out of consideration the fact that 
it was European Continental models that shaped legal institutions in 
Japan – something which would have done much to explain features 
which to American eyes were taken to be characteristically Japanese. 
The much lower incarceration rate in Italy as compared to the USA is 
less interesting once Italian rates are seen to be in line with those in 
Europe more generally. Indeed, it ceases to be something that tells you 
much about Italy as such. 
Depending on our purposes a large variety of ‘units’ may be usefully 
compared. We can compare whole societies, as in identifying distinct 
patterns to European and American ways of responding to threats like 
drug trafficking (Fukumi, 2009), or nation-specific approaches to stop-
ping human trafficking (Munro, 2006). Or we may seek to sharpen our 
understanding of different features within criminal justice systems, 
whether they be police practices, prosecution procedures, the rights 
of victims and defendants, negotiated justice, or the influence of the 
media (Delmas-Marty and Spencer, 2002). We may thus discover that 
the antibodies to political corruption in Europe are (or were) mainly to 
be found in the bureaucracy in Germany, in the judiciary in Italy, and 
in Parliament in the UK (Della Porta and Meny, 1997). 
Just as many comparisons in criminology consider the influence of 
general trends, such as the growing period before young people find 
work or increasing immigration, so the same applies to developments in 
dealing with crime problems. We can look for differences across places 
in the rise of preventative measures or restitutive justice, the decline in 
the power of the state as compared to the market, or the loss of faith 
in some professions accompanied by the rise of new ones. But working 
out the various implications of trends can be complicated. There may, 
for example, be growing intolerance of some kinds of behaviour but 
increasing tolerance of others. Hence, in addition to examining differ-
ences in criminal justice systems seen statically, we must also investi-
gate their dynamics as they each react differentially to similar kinds of 
challenge over time. Litigation or administrative remedies may offer 
two contrasting, though not necessarily equally effective, routes to pro-
tecting prisoners’ rights, but the balance between them may change 
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(Lazarus, 2004). Often a cause célèbre provides a good opportunity for 
comparative analysis. Consider, for example, the different responses 
in the UK and Norway to extreme cases of murder by young children 
(Green, 2007). Interestingly, the Italian juvenile justice system, despite 
allowing most juveniles accused of murder to be dealt with by pre-trial 
probation, drew the line in the so-called Erica and Omar case, where 
a pair of middle-class teenagers killed the girl’s mother and younger 
brother. Their lawyer did in fact ask for this disposal, but they actually 
received 16 and 14 years in prison. 
On similarities and differences
All comparison involves the identification of similarities and differ-
ences over space and time. Why do nation-state prison rates tend to 
group together at the same level by geographical areas? (Aebi and Stadnic, 
2007). If Italy and Spain share many similarities in their criminal justice 
systems (including their current criminalisation of immigrants), how 
much this is to do with their political economies and how much to 
do with their histories and religious traditions? Or comparative work 
can involve arguing that what seems different is really similar, and vice 
versa. Showing similarities or difference in itself, however, is not enough. 
We must have theoretical justifications for showing why our findings 
are interesting (because unexpected). It is usually of limited interest to 
demonstrate that societies do not behave as would be expected accord-
ing to ideal-type classifications of families of law. Such discrepancies 
may only tell us about the weakness of our starting points. 
If the issue is how to look for the unexpected, it may be helpful to 
bear a number of rules of thumb in mind. First, we need to avoid assum-
ing similarity at all costs. As Geertz puts it, ‘the comparative study of law 
cannot be a matter of reducing concrete differences to abstract commo-
nalities ... law is local knowledge not placeless principle’ (Geertz, 1973: 
215). Indeed, some leading comparative sociologists have insisted that 
at a time where forces conducing to homogenisation are so strong, we 
should focus more on differences than similarities. The particular is not 
only often more interesting than the general; politically speaking, it is 
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the right choice, because we should be seeking to preserve particularity and 
diversity (Sztompka, 1990). Sexual offences and corruption are par-
ticularly rich areas for cross-cultural comparison. In Japan, President 
Clinton’s wife would have had to apologise for her husband’s conduct 
(West, 2009). Such differences remind us of the need to descend from 
the high level of abstraction, where it is too easy to assume that there 
must be more similarities than differences. 
On the other hand, we also need to be aware that differences can 
be and often are exaggerated (although the ‘social achievement’ of 
constructing such purported differences may in fact be what we want 
to explain). It has been plausibly claimed by a leading author that 
Continental Europe is more receptive to rationalistic technology trans-
fers whereas England and the USA are more resistant to abstract ideas 
(Tonry, 2001). But the idea of rights is crucial in the USA and even the 
UK played an important role early on in drafting the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights. Thus, although I have given this book the subtitle 
Making Sense of Difference, sometimes the challenge may be more to 
explain similarities than differences (in so far as they are different from 
what we would expect). Comparative work is both about discovering sur-
prising differences and unexpected similarities. Setting out to demonstrate 
that all higher courts play a central and less than independent role in 
ensuring governmental social control becomes a provocative argument 
if the cultures surveyed are as different as Muslim, Chinese, French and 
British (Shapiro, 1981). We may want to explain why judicial power is 
growing in places otherwise as different as Italy and Thailand. 
The search for differences is often motivated by the desire to show 
the limits of supposedly universal claims (though without necessarily 
assuming a priori the impossibility of finding cross-cultural truths and 
values). Johnson’s work on prosecutors in Japan was intended not only 
to show their lack of interest in producing convictions, but also to criti-
cise those (largely US) scholars who argued that ‘all prosecutors’, by the 
nature of their job, aim to maximise convictions (Johnson, 2000). Italy, 
too, can provide valuable examples for this purpose. Criminal justice 
usually targets the poor and less powerful and offers immunity to the 
more powerful. Yet in the 1990s the judges managed to use the crimi-
nal law there so as to cancel all the traditional parties of government 
(Nelken, 1996). 
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One clue to interesting similarities and differences can be found in 
‘significant absences’, as Lacey and Zedner argue when describing and 
explaining the historical reasons for the absence of a discourse about 
‘community justice’ in Germany (Lacey and Zedner, 1998). In Italy, why 
are policemen rarely seen as authoritative spokesmen on the crime prob-
lem? Why do popular newspapers there still have less power to shape 
political action over crime than in the USA and the UK? Understanding 
the causes, consequences and meaning of such ‘significant’ differences 
in fact requires interpretation and explanation of both absence and pres-
ence in each of the cultures concerned. To understand the role played 
by laymen in criminal justice in Britain as opposed to Italy, it would be 
necessary to investigate both the reasons why the involvement of lay-
men is favoured in Britain as well as what state officials symbolise in 
Italy. If the Italian system of criminal justice has relatively more built-in 
leniency than the Anglo-American system, we need to explain both the 
comparative indulgence of the first and the harshness of the other.
Working out the significance of absence and presence can be even 
more complicated than this. Absence has a shape, in the sense that there 
may be a definite sense of what is missing. Many Italians bemoan the 
lack of a well-functioning state, and though they mainly lambast their 
politicians, they also sometimes blame themselves (the expression ‘we 
don’t have the sense of the state’ is heard frequently). But the state they 
feel the absence of is quite definitely the French or German idea of the 
state, with its collective project taken forward by the organs and offi-
cials of the nation, rather than the ‘foreign’ English or American liberal 
conception of government as the servant of civil society (Dyson, 1980). 
In the European tradition ‘the legal system is the way the state makes 
ethical the system of needs of civil society’ (Melossi, 1990: 100–2). From 
this continental perspective it is the Anglo-American ideas of the state, 
one in which popular sovereignty replaced the role of the ideal repre-
sentative of social and political stability, and in which private interests 
have an inherent legitimacy, which seemed, and can still seem, strange 
(Ferrarese, 1997).
When it comes to identifying distinctiveness on the basis of ‘absence 
and presence’, we need to be aware that legal and political discourses 
may have only an uncertain relationship to social practices. The observer 
may find the ‘problem’ or threat to be similar, but the rhetoric very 
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different – or vice versa. Both practice and discourse therefore need to 
be studied independently as well as in relation to each other. In one 
country, the debate may centre on public order policing, while, in prac-
tice, police surveillance goes on unnoticed; another culture may be 
concerned about the risks of private surveillance, but take for granted 
the role of public police patrols (Zedner, 1995: 526–7). The relation-
ship between discourse and practice can also be paradoxical. The Italian 
national state is, in theory, a collective impersonal project. In practice, 
however, its survival with any sort of credibility often comes down to 
the calibre and integrity (or the lack of these qualities) of a very limited 
number of individual politicians, judges or policemen, some of whom 
risk martyrdom in its name. In Britain there is much less use of the 
notion of ‘the state’ as compared to simply talking in a relatively per-
sonalised way about the government of the day. But there seems to 
be no contradiction at all between this talk of individuals and strong 
identification with the nation-state (helped by, but surely not reducible 
to, the institution of the monarchy). 
Comparing like with like
It is commonly said that a comparison is only valid if we are comparing 
‘like with like’, but teasing out what this means is not easy. As Sztompka 
(1990: 47) asks: ‘What makes a difference a difference? When is the 
same really the same, when is the same really different?’ For some pur-
poses, it can even be useful to compare like with unlike, as when Hagan 
looks for similarities in ‘exclusion’ in the global north and global south 
(Hagan and Wyland-Richmond, 2008). Could the way the UK deals 
with white-collar criminals have at least something interesting in com-
mon with the methods Italy uses for handling juvenile delinquents 
in the way it seeks to avoid criminalisation at all costs? What some see 
as the ‘narcissism of small differences’, others may regard as very impor-
tant, as when scholars insist on the differences in the USA and English 
versions of ‘zero tolerance’, or point to considerable differences in the 
way common law countries interpret the role of problem-solving courts 
(Nolan, 2009). Continental Europeans often talk of the Anglo-American 
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type of law, but common law scholars point to profound differences 
between the formalism of the English system of law as compared to the 
substantive approach of American law.
Considerable argument and evidence may be needed to show whether 
or not extraneous matters undermine the point of a comparison. On 
the one hand, what is being compared will always be different in some 
respect or else there would be nothing to compare. On the other hand, 
unappreciated differences in respect of relevant features of what we are 
trying to understand can be so significant as to undermine the value of 
any given comparison. Can juvenile justice in Italy be properly com-
pared with that in the UK, given the larger role of the family in Italy? 
Is that the key to the comparison or rather a factor that takes away its 
point? When Savelsberg and King (2005) point out how much more 
Germany has institutionalised efforts to seek public atonement for 
the Holocaust/Shoa than American governments have done for their 
genocide of Native Americans (or for the victims of slavery and the 
slave trade), there may be some who think it debatable whether this is 
comparing like with like. But it is a debate worth having.
What is meant by comparing ‘like with like’ is the effort to hold con-
stant in our comparison those factors – regarding time frames, threats, 
legal systems, economies, politics or whatever – which would otherwise 
take away the point of a given comparison. At the same time, however, 
it is usually reference to those factors that will also form part of our 
explanation of difference. It is the apt choice of constants which set up 
the puzzle at the heart of any worthwhile comparison: the more the 
constants would seem to cover relevant factors, the more surprising 
and instructive the finding of difference. Why do different countries 
in the European Union deal with similar European Union frauds so 
differently? (Passas and Nelken, 1993). If victims have the ‘same needs’ 
in Germany and the UK, why is the police response and the activity 
of victim groups so different? Why are victims even more satisfied in 
Germany despite getting less attention than they do in the UK? (Mawby 
and Kirchoff, 1996). Why, under the same type of communist system 
was the role of prosecutors weak in Poland but strong in Russia? And 
why does that still remain true? (Polak and Nelken, 2010).
The central claim of this book is that we will face difficulties in iden-
tifying what to hold constant unless we already know quite a lot about 
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the places being compared (and the larger the number of units being 
compared the more tricky this can be). To compare levels of punitive-
ness it is not enough just to compare prison rates. We can and must go 
beyond mere quantitative measures of penal sanctions so as to add a 
qualitative dimension of ‘harshness’, for example with respect to the 
way prisoners are treated (Whitman, 2003). But even this may not be 
enough to be sure we are comparing like with like. What should we do 
about other types of social control that exist in a given society? What 
of the fact that, in some countries, the numbers held involuntarily in 
other types of total institution, especially mental asylums, have fallen 
almost in proportion to the rise of the numbers in prison? Even if there 
is no simple transfer of populations going on here, we should not lose 
sight of this reverse trend to decarceration. A generation back the fear 
was that the proliferation of such ‘soft’ social control would lead to 
the growth of the ‘punitive city’ (Cohen, 1985). Are we now just to 
ignore such types of punitiveness? Current ‘penal technologies’ bundle 
together risk prevention and welfare strategies for different offences 
and offenders in ways that undifferentiated talk of punitiveness fails 
to capture.
If the number of black people imprisoned in the USA rose seven 
times in the later nineteenth century after the abolition of slavery, this 
surely must have implications for measuring the level of punitiveness 
before and after that event. Limiting our discussion only to changes in 
prison rates would certainly be misleading. But, if this is true in looking 
at US prison rates over time, we can imagine at least as great difficul-
ties when we engage in cross-cultural comparisons. What of the fact 
that the police in Pakistan, Brazil and elsewhere are said to be involved 
in thousands of semi-institutionalised killings yearly? (Johnson and 
Zimring, 2008). Both the Mafia in Italy and the Yakuza organised crime 
groups in Japan are involved in social control (with, at the extreme, 
their own form of death penalty). Why should this not count when 
considering the statistics of penal control?
Some American textbooks do bring in so-called ‘informal’ social con-
trol as the explanation of differences in criminal justice in discussing 
low prison rates in Japan and Saudi Arabia. Japan may have compara-
tively few people in prison, but the risks of ostracism for rule-breaking 
may often be considerable. Sociologists of the family in Italy speak of 
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a generation living in a ‘gilded prison’ that has had little chance to 
have any political role in society. But it is not simply that other forms 
of social control supplement official criminal justice. Criminal justice 
itself may be understood primarily as the control of the poor (Waquant, 
2009a, 2009b), or a way of reinforcing the restrictions on racial or 
ethnic groups (Tonry, 1995), though how (far) this is true will vary from 
place to place. 
In addition, and contrary to the claims of some behavioural soci-
ologists of law (Black, 1976), there is no reason to assume that repres-
siveness in the wider society (‘informal social control’) and the use of 
prison (‘governmental social control’) are inversely correlated. We can, 
for example, identify societies, such as China, that are both repressive 
and have high prison rates, and others that are repressive but have low 
prison rates, such as present-day Saudi Arabia, or Spain under Franco. 
Where the USA, with its high prison levels, fits into this picture is more 
uncertain. Certainly, law enters in detail into every part of life – and 
criminal law since 9/11 and the Patriot Act has been ever more ubiqui-
tous. Simon’s celebrated analysis of ‘governing through crime’ (Simon, 
2007) argues that the metaphors and methods of criminal justice have 
been replacing other forms of social control in the family, the school 
and the workplace. But relative to many other places, the USA still, 
in some respects, bestows an unusual level of political and religious 
freedoms on groups and individuals. 
The fact that we are always holding some things constant means 
that we are rarely dealing only with similarities or differences. Rather, 
what we will usually need to explain is the unfamiliar mixture of both 
in any given case. Noting this can help us avoid the common error of 
seeing patterns of criminal justice elsewhere as made up of only their 
differences – and not also by their similarities to us. Cities in the USA 
and Europe are governed differently but social control is built into urban 
design in both places (Body-Genrot, 2000). Surveillance in Japan has sim-
ilarities with that found in Western countries, but it also has suggestive 
specificities (Wood, 2009). 
When we set out to ‘tell difference’ (Nelken, 2000b) we always need 
to think ‘as compared to what?’ It would not be difficult to point to 
much that is special about crime and criminal justice in Italy: the 
level of organised crime (with four powerful crime groups conditioning 
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political and economic life in much of the south), the unresolved 
problem of political corruption, the struggle between the long-standing 
Italian premier Berlusconi and the judges he regularly accuses of perse-
cuting him, the delays that afflict the legal system, and so on. 
But there are also many similarities in how criminal justice works in 
Italy and advanced Western societies, and the commonalities between 
Italian and many other Continental European approaches are even 
greater. We can find parallels in Italy to many of the developments and 
concerns that are at the centre of research on criminal justice in Britain 
and other English-speaking countries. In both settings there is consider-
able discussion of the exponential increase in crime since the Second 
World War and the more recent apparent growth in the fear of crime. 
The same types of socially and economically marginal people fill up the 
prisons, usually for offences involving theft or drug dealing. Likewise, 
the evolution of crime prevention follows much the same pattern and 
local government initiatives are taking on some of the responsibilities 
previously monopolised by the state. Along with increasing resort to 
technology, such as investment in closed-circuit television, there is 
a massive growth in private policing in securing the safety of banks, 
and the ‘public-private’ spaces of shopping malls, though not as yet so 
much as an essential part of housing developments for the rich. 
In Italy, too, we can discover experiments in mediation between 
offenders and victims, especially in cases involving juveniles. It also 
takes part in international victim surveys and organises annual victim 
surveys for internal monitoring of its crime problem. Slogans such as 
‘zero tolerance’ are used by political campaigners of different persua-
sions, both by the mayor of Milan responding to social alarm over 
increased street crime, and by women’s groups taking forward their 
struggle against assault and harassment in the home and at work. All 
over the world, Italy included, public opinion about crime is increas-
ingly shaped by the ‘virtual’ knowledge produced by the media and this 
in turn shapes police action as they seek to build legitimacy and defend 
their resources. 
To some extent it is a matter of choice whether to emphasise simi-
larities or differences, and this choice will often depend on the purposes 
of our comparisons. We may be tempted to argue that we cannot learn 
from practices in another society because it is ‘too different’ from ours. 
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But sometimes an institution is borrowed in the hope it will actually 
help make the borrowing society more similar! Claims about both simi-
larities and differences, or normality and exceptionality, can have con-
sequences and be exploited for political purposes. The elites in post-war 
Finland sought to bring down their incarceration rates so as to be more 
in line with other Scandinavian countries. The Canadians keep a watch-
ful eye on their own rates so as to show how very much lower they are 
than those in their powerful neighbour but seem less concerned that 
their rate is higher than those in Europe. Policy-makers in Scotland would 
like to think that their criminal justice system is more enlightened than 
that of England and Wales – and sometimes it is. 
Societies, institutions, places, rates, ideas can all be exceptional or 
‘normal’. But findings about the existence of difference or similarity 
are not in themselves ‘progressive’ or otherwise. This depends on the 
specific arguments advanced. As Maureen Cain has argued, we need 
to take care that our comparisons do not fall into the vices of either 
Occidentalism or Orientalism, i.e. making other cultures seem necessar-
ily similar to ours, or intrinsically ‘other’ (Cain, 2000b). Pace Sztompka 
(1990), too much insistence on difference can also sometimes be a form 
of ‘othering’. There is no denying that external influences often pro-
duce pressure for change to ‘normality’, but sometimes they also come 
from within. A variety of Italian writers, just after the Tangentopoli inves-
tigations had revealed widespread political corruption, wrote books 
bemoaning the fact that Italy was not a ‘normal’ country. On the other 
hand, ‘best practice’, by definition, is also not normal.
THREE
ways of making sense
The theoretical approaches we draw on to develop persuasive accounts 
of the workings of criminal justice in different places will vary accord-
ing to the topics being investigated. As is seen in some of the most 
powerful recent analyses, such as those of Garland (2001) or Waquant 
(2009a, 2009b), we need to draw on both the materialist and symbolic 
dimensions of punishment. In line with the major theme of this book, 
I limit myself here to discussing the basic question of how we attribute or 
grasp meaning. First, I contrast explanatory and interpretative enquiries 
and say something about how such strategies can be brought together. 
I then go on to consider how the choice of approach shapes the place 
of terms like ‘culture’ and ‘legal culture’ in our attempts to make sense 
of difference.
Explanation versus interpretation 
The choice between causal explanation and empathetic interpretation, 
or between nomothetic and idiographic approaches to social behav-
iour, are vexed and still controversial questions within the methodol-
ogy and history of the social sciences. On one approach, still dominant 
in the influential USA criminological literature, our task is to search for 
cross-culturally valid explanations. The role of science is to get beyond 
common sense and the individuals we are studying may not know the 
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causes and consequences of their actions (especially the unintended 
ones which are often the result of unexpected combinations with others). 
In categorising countries or societies as more or less religious (for exam-
ple, in relation to the retention of the death penalty) we do not neces-
sarily need to approach this causal factor as participants themselves 
would understand it. The choice of which variables to study will be 
based on previous research by the community of scholars; each new 
research then seeks to take matters further. 
By contrast, for more interpretative approaches, intentional social 
action is what produces social outcomes. Religion as a key factor effect-
ing outcomes must therefore be religious teaching as understood by 
those involved. This can help us understand why links between religion 
and aspects of criminal justice can be different in different places and at 
different times. Social actors can draw selectively on their cultural herit-
ages as a ‘tool-kit’ or resource (Melossi, 2001). For classical writers, such 
as Weber our accounts must be persuasive both at the level of cause and 
the level of meaning. But there are even those who would reject any 
search for causes and move enquiry more into the realm of ‘how’ than 
that of ‘why’ questions. They would focus on the shared construction 
of meaning – on how and when the efficacy of ‘religion’ is invoked, 
and by whom. 
There are leading writers in this field of social research, just as in 
others, who line up more towards one or other end of this continuum. 
On the one hand, we could take Greenberg and West (2008) as a model 
example of a cross-national study of variables carefully correlated with 
the use of the death penalty (that shows religion to be the decisive 
determining factor). At the other extreme, in his subtle account of 
policy-making for victims of crime in Canada, Paul Rock tells us that 
developments cannot be analysed with ‘clear cause and effects’ since 
events ‘fold back on each other’ and ‘officials make causes through their 
arguments rather than vice versa’ (Rock, 1986: 67ff). But it would be a 
pity if comparative criminal justice were to become just a battle-ground 
for proponents of different approaches to explanation (Travers, 2008).
To stress the value of interpretation in cross-cultural enquiries does 
not imply, as some argue, a commitment to relativism (Pakes, 2004: 13), 
or make it impossible to establish ‘non-contextual truths’ (Edwards and 
Hughes, 2005). There is nothing relativist about the claim that the 
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correlations we investigate or discover become ‘explanations’ only when 
given ‘sense’ by theoretical hypotheses shaped by our different cultural 
experiences (which accounts for why we find some explanations more 
‘plausible’ and normatively attractive than others). Rather than claiming 
that interpretative understanding should replace the search for expla-
nation, I have insisted on the need to combine these two approaches 
(Nelken, 1994b), arguing that ‘understanding’ must come ‘before’, as 
well as ‘after’, ‘explanation’ (Nelken, 2002). Urging comparativists to be 
more reflexive about which variables they select for their explanations is 
a goal that only a non-relativist would bother to pursue. 
The choice between explanation and interpretation often also over-
laps with – even if it should not be confused with – the difference 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches and macro-social and 
micro-social levels of analysis. Large-scale quantitative cross-cultural 
comparisons in particular require some sort of common denominator 
of meaning for key dependent variables such as rates of crime and pun-
ishment. But these cross-national penal ‘indicators’ can often obscure 
what needs to be understood. Take, from among the wealth of tables 
classifying different aspects of criminal justice to be found in Van Dijk’s 
recent comprehensive sourcebook, the one that has to do with judicial 
independence. We are told that Italy’s judiciary comes rather low down 
on the criterion of ‘independence’. The judges in the UK, by contrast, 
are among the very highest (Van Dijk, 2007: 376; the UK gets a score of 
6, the USA 5.7, Italy only 4.4.).
Perhaps this is so. But a lot depends on what is taken to be ‘inde-
pendence’. Independence from whom? (The government? The public?) 
This indicator is in fact built out of the perceptions of businessmen as 
to which judiciaries are most independent of undue pressure of gov-
ernment, private persons or firms. But theirs is not the only relevant 
perspective, especially when it comes to issues of criminal justice. In 
Italy, for much of the past twenty years, following its anti-corruption 
successes, the judiciary has been under constant attack by politicians, 
who see it as having far too much independence (Nelken, 1996). As in 
most places on the continent, judges are neither appointed nor elected, 
but selected by public examination immediately after university. They 
therefore represent a wide range of the political spectrum. In addition, 
in Italy, prosecutors are considered part of the judiciary and are, like 
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them, constitutionally immovable from their posts. Their promotion 
and pay is almost entirely tied only to seniority (even without the need 
of changing job) and not to the dictates of politicians who, it is feared, 
might otherwise exercise a conditioning effect on their decision-making. 
Decisions over who gets senior administrative roles, internal discipline 
and so on are made by the judiciary’s own elected parliament, which 
protects what they call their ‘autonomy’ from government.
By contrast, until recently, judges in England were appointed by the 
government from successful middle-aged lawyers – on the advice of 
a senior judge who is also a minister. Sensitive prosecution decisions 
are in the hands of another government minister, and in a number of 
recent cases there have been real doubts about how far government 
interpretations of the national interest have been placed above the nor-
mal rules of criminal law. Turning to the USA, many judges are elected 
by the citizenry, while, for those who are appointed, the ability to curry 
political favour and mix with the local elites is an essential part of the 
job. Of course there is always more that can be said. There are docu-
mented cases of some Italian judges who have been found to be cor-
rupt, and it is a moot question whether the allegiance that many judges 
in Italy have to the quasi-political groupings that elect their representa-
tives in the judges’ parliament weakens their independence as single 
judges. Is the low score intended as a measure of the political attacks to 
which judges are exposed? But resistance to these attacks might equally 
be seen as proof of how independent they are.
Interpretative types of enquiry, on the other hand, are the preferred 
option where the aim is to show congruence between meanings and 
values in criminal justice and the larger culture. For example, how ideas 
about the state and citizen are reflected and reproduced by the role 
assigned to the accused in French criminal justice (Field, 2006). They 
are also essential when we set out to make sense of puzzling events. 
How can it be, asked a well-informed American commentator on Italian 
affairs in 2008, that on the very day that Prime Minister Berlusconi’s 
English lawyer was convicted in an Italian court of lying to protect the 
prime minister, it was the leader of the Italian opposition who resigned. 
As Becker reminds us, the first rule when we are faced with a strange 
social phenomenon should be to assume that there is some sense to be 
found if we can only find a way to grasp it (Becker, 1997: 28).
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There are important differences between explanatory and interpretative 
approaches. We risk inconsistency if we insist on the ‘embeddedness’ 
of meaning but also try to use ‘objectified’ prison rates as part of our 
explanations of different penal climates (Nelken, 2006a). But they can 
also be complimentary. We could, for example, distinguish among the 
different tasks of enquiry. If the interpretative approach is an essential 
step in generating hypotheses and insights, the explanatory approach 
is the only way we can test their applicability to a wider range of cases. 
We could also draw on each approach so as to examine variables from 
more than one point of view. As an explanatory factor, Catholicism in 
Italy could be treated as an important institution, one that is sometimes 
united with and sometimes in competition with the political system (as 
seen, for instance, in its efforts currently to moderate the effort of right-
wing governments to criminalise immigrants). But, and at the same 
time, on an interpretative approach, Catholicism can also be seen as the 
source of ideals concerning what should be penalised and obligations 
of tolerance and forgiveness which help shape – or compete with – the 
ideas developed in the state system. 
One author who has recently set out to explain why the criminal 
justice systems in southern European countries are now sending a dis-
proportionate number of immigrants to prison has demonstrated a 
statistical correlation between the propensity of immigrants to com-
mit crimes and indicators of the generally poor functioning of local 
political institutions – as seen in the extent of the black economy and 
disrespect for law (Solivetti, 2010). But a broader approach to the same 
issue (apart from bringing in the role of criminal justice institutions 
themselves) would also seek to grasp the meaning and role of talk about 
the immigrant crime problem. Thus a book of thoughtful interviews 
in the Netherlands provide us with a variety of perspectives on why the 
murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands had 
such an impact in such a historically ‘tolerant’ country and helps us 
understand why the proportion of immigrants in prison in that coun-
try is almost at the level of southern Europe, despite its local institu-
tions being Northern European ones (Baruma, 2006). On the other hand, 
those interviewed may not be representative, and it can be easy to make too 
much of them. An interpretative approach should also not distract us from 
investigating the structural factors linked to problems of integration 
 ways of making sense  45
that can help explain why the number of immigrants in prison is so 
high in that country.
A related issue that highlights these differences in explanatory 
approaches is the role of agency as compared to structural constraints 
in the defining and application of criminal sanctions. At one extreme 
we have the functionalist approach, which has roots both in social 
science and comparative law. This treats agency as substantially irrel-
evant; function does not equal purpose. It invites us to look for the 
manifest or latent functions of any given element of criminal justice 
in relation to other elements, to the rest of the legal system, or to the 
society of which it is part. It explores the way other agencies of social 
control, from private police to illegal associations such as the Yakuza in 
Japan, serve some of the same functions of the official system (Vagg, 
1993), or suggests that the individualising of sentences by judges is 
de facto forestalled by sentencing commissions (Wandall, 2006).
A standard move of comparativists is to ask questions such as what 
do different jurisdictions use instead of bail to make sure that offenders 
turn up for trial? Conversely, they may tell us that bail decisions them-
selves sometimes have other functions. Although judges in ‘drug courts’ 
in Ireland cannot bring back cases for review as they do in the USA, they 
can and do achieve much the same aim through the way they set bail 
conditions (Nolan, 2009). Even in a regime of obligatory prosecution, 
decisions or non-decisions on priorities are being made (Nelken and 
Zanier, 2006). Knowing the answer to such questions is essential if we 
are to avoid introducing ‘reforms’ that duplicate or distort already exist-
ing local ‘best practice’ (Feeley, 1983). With some imagination we may 
also see that what appears at first to be only ‘noise’, aspects of procedure 
involving inefficiency and delay, may be playing important functions. 
(It would be interesting to compare the role of delays in criminal pro-
ceedings cases in Italy with those in the USA for death penalty cases). 
But functional language, as sociologists have long ago shown, can 
involve a number of traps. We need, for example, always to ask func-
tional for what, and for whom? The search for ‘functional equivalents’ 
has been a matter of fierce controversy in debates over the comparability 
of continental penal procedures and alleged alternatives to ‘plea bar-
gaining’ (Langbein and Weinrib, 1978; Volkmann-Schluck, 1981). There 
is no a priori reason to think that something must be doing a given 
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job – bail or otherwise. Perhaps the news about a given system could 
be that there is, in fact, no equivalent. It is misleading to assume that 
modern criminal justice systems all face the same ‘problems’ even if 
they deal with them in different ways. ‘Problems’ – and ‘solutions’ – 
are perceived and constructed differently within different cultures. As I 
wrote soon after moving to Italy:
Functionalism is a good servant but a poor master. ... Living in another 
country has given me a jaundiced view of the sort of comparative 
research which sets out to show that all societies face basically similar 
problems even if they may solve them in somewhat different ways. What 
is more striking is the power of culture to produce relatively circular defi-
nitions of what is worth fighting for and against and the way institutions 
and practices express genuinely different histories and distinct priorities. 
(Nelken, 1992/1996: 356)
I would now add that what culture means can be equally problematic.
The strengths and weaknesses of functional explanation can be 
well illustrated from our running example concerning the rule of 
obligatory prosecution in Italy. On a functionalist view, it would be 
assumed that all criminal justice systems of a certain complexity must 
face similar operational problems of coping with overload and the effi-
cient throughput of cases. Certainly, the Italian criminal justice system 
faces similar, or even worse, problems of management to those found 
elsewhere. The criminal law has enormous reach – judges and pros-
ecutors often taking upon themselves the task of ‘substituting’ for the 
government where there are insufficient or contradictory signals about 
how to handle a pressing social problem, for example unaccompanied 
young immigrants arriving in Italy who are not allowed to work but 
cannot be expelled. 
A function of legally permitted discretionary decision-making is that 
it makes it easier to manage problems of priorities. We would therefore 
expect to find that where prosecution discretion is heavily restricted 
there would be other ‘functional equivalents’ and we can in fact identify 
numerous features of the Italian criminal process which do provide 
the chance to filter out cases or exercise priorities. The threshold deci-
sion whether or not there is enough evidence to take a case to trial, or 
whether instead to opt for what is called archiviazione, provided some 
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opportunity for exercise of choice. Another sort of (somewhat random) 
flexibility is provided by competing and overlapping jurisdictions of 
types of law and courts and the three stages of trial. The Italian criminal 
justice system thus has some functional equivalents of discretionary 
decision-making, though not necessarily where they would be found 
in other systems. Although little of this would be described in Italy as 
the exercise of ‘discretion’, for the sociologist it can be important to 
discover how flexibility is built into the system and not only how the 
actors label it. 
But we also need to be cautious not to go too far in searching for 
‘functional equivalents’, especially if this is based in the idea that every 
system is predestined to reach a certain level of efficiency. In Italy even 
apparently minimal functional operating requirements are not met and 
it is frequently not easy to determine what is functional and for whom. 
Many judges and prosecutors believe the courts are underfunded and 
left dealing with an overload so as to keep them from pursuing politi-
cally sensitive matters. The apparently irrational distribution of courts 
around the country is explained mainly by political pressure not to 
lose the courthouse as a sign of local prestige. Formalities and compli-
cated division or overlapping of responsibilities help produce enormous 
delays for which Italy is regularly condemned by the European Court of 
Human Rights at Strasbourg. The language of functionalism is especially 
misleading if it suggests that all criminal justice systems operate with a 
managerial vision of their purposes. This itself varies by culture.
By contrast to most work in the mainstream, interpretative approaches 
focus more on trying to present a clearer picture of such purposes. They 
speak of reasons and motives rather than functions and causes and give 
more importance to agency. They would draw attention to the fact that 
politicians, in the UK, such as Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair, had 
characteristic ways of approaching the issue of crime, and that Douglas 
Hurd, the mandarin Tory minister (the Home Secretary), who was 
responsible for criminal justice matters in the 1990s, relied heavily on 
policy advice from his senior civil servants, whereas Michael Howard, 
a later successor, took a more populist approach, insisting on the basis 
of his own reading of the evidence – that ‘prison works’. In Italy, many 
‘reforms’ of criminal procedure were directly connected to Berlusconi’s 
attempt to extricate himself from pending court proceedings. 
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Other individuals can also make a difference (think of Darrel Vandeveld, 
the catholic prosecutor who resigned rather than continue to be involved 
as military prosecutor in the trials in Guantanamo)..But agency is not 
just a matter of named individuals. In Italy, the organised left-leaning 
group of judges Magistratura Democratica sees itself as playing a vital role 
in defending what it calls jurisdizione from political threats. Reductions 
in prison rates in other countries have been attributed to decisions of 
bureaucratic elites, as in post-Second World War Finland (Van Hofer, 
2003; Lappi-Seppala, 2007). Vice versa, the growth in incarceration 
rates in other countries is attributed to the ‘fall of the Platonic guardi-
ans’ (Loader, 2006), such as the reduced reliance by ministers in England 
and Wales on senior civil servants in the Home Office (Ministry of Justice), 
even if this has also been seen as greater democratic responsiveness (Ryan, 
2003). 
For many of those who use interpretative approaches, it is only by 
finding out what criminal justice actors and others actually think they 
are doing that we can make sense of it. As West puts it, ‘to understand 
scandal cross-culturally we need some way of exploring people’s belief 
about it’ (West, 2009: 4). But interpretative approaches do not have to 
limit themselves to this. Jim Whitman, for example, in his interest-
ing study of relative leniency in punishment in Continental Europe 
describes the ‘structures of feeling’ that derive from egalitarian and ine-
galitarian social orders (Whitman, 2003). At the same time, however, he 
rejects explanations offered by some of his interviewees who attributed 
leniency in Europe to the experience of having been German prisoners 
of war or in concentration camps. 
On culture and concepts
An obvious route to making sense of differences in criminal justice prac-
tices would seem to lie in the idea of culture, seen as a historically shaped 
sets of habits, understandings, values and priorities that shape or exem-
plify what societies choose to sanction and how they do so (e.g. Karstedt, 
2008). Thus the textbooks tell us that the fact that in Japan prosecutors 
dismiss many cases is affirmation of their Japanese ‘norm of avoidance’ 
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of formal judicial processes (Dammer, Fairchild and Albanese, 2005: 157). 
As often, however, culture is contrasted with instrumentality. Some 
writers conclude that on the continent judicial supervision is only ‘a 
myth’, or claim that terms such as ‘zero tolerance’ have ‘only’ symbolic 
importance. A more culturalist perspective would stress that there are 
few things more important than myths and symbols as a way of creating 
identity, expressing commitment and serving as regulatory ideals.
‘Legal culture’ (Friedman, 1975), a term that focuses on legal aspects 
of culture, may be of particular relevance for the study of comparative 
criminal justice. I have elsewhere redefined this term for comparative 
purposes as 
one way of describing relatively stable patterns of legally-oriented social 
behaviour and attitudes. The identifying elements of legal culture range 
from facts about institutions such as the number and role of lawyers, 
or the ways judges are appointed and controlled, to various forms of 
behaviour, such as litigation or prison rates, and, at the other extreme, 
more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities. Like 
culture itself, legal culture is about who we are, not just what we do. 
(Nelken, 2004a: 1)
Using this idea could help us decide what sense to give to the idea of 
criminal justice as a set of supposedly interconnected legal decisions. 
Cross-culturally, ‘criminal justice’ may not always be the term used to 
get at this, but in most systems the various actors involved are likely 
to claim that there ought to be some overall coherence to these deci-
sions. What is certain is that, wherever one looks, decisions at one point 
have implications for others (with consequences that are sometimes 
unintended). Abolish capital punishment and the use of prison is likely 
to go up, reduce police discretion and more falls to the prosecution. 
The various features of criminal justice in Italy that we have been dis-
cussing also interact. For example, the way prosecutors implement the 
rule of obligatory prosecution can lead to counter-intuitive out-
comes in practice. The length of time before a case becomes time-
bound (i.e. prescribed) is statutorily related to the gravity of offence 
– the more serious the offence, the more time is available. Under orders 
(from either or both the head of the office and the ministry) not to 
allow cases to become time-bound, prosecutors therefore often feel the 
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need to focus their effort on less serious cases with impending prescrip-
tion dates, rather than more serious cases which have longer times still 
to run (Nelken and Zanier, 2006). When prosecutors increase their 
speed of throughput a new bottleneck appears at the stage of court 
hearings (Sarzotti, 2008).
A useful distinction made by Friedman is that between ‘internal 
legal culture’, the ideas and practices of those working for or within 
the legal system, and ‘external legal culture’, the opinions, actions and 
pressures brought to bear on law by those outside it. This could be help-
ful in exploring differences in the involvement of lay people in the 
system of criminal justice, or the significance attached to surveys of 
public attitudes to sentencing and of the fear of crime. The respect in 
which internal legal culture is open to external legal culture is a key 
aspect of criminal justice. If we want to understand why practices such 
as victim–offender mediation have had less fortune in some countries 
in Continental Europe than in Anglo-American type jurisdictions, we 
have to take into account, inter alia, the way the European ‘state’ project 
limits the kind of role individual victims are expected to play in the 
criminal process (Crawford, 2000a). In Japan, whose borrowing of 
the continental model reinforced its top-down approach, internal legal 
culture has been, until recently, relatively immune to public opinion. 
According to David Johnson: the lack of external pressures clearly privi-
leges ‘internal legal culture’, the ideas, values, expectations and attitudes 
that prosecutors have about criminal law, behaviour and justice. But the 
ideas mobilised by prosecutors – and others in the legal system – also 
relate to wider aspects of Japanese culture. Johnson attributes particular 
significance to the Japanese belief that human nature is perfectible, in 
contrast to the Christian doctrine of original sin (Johnson, 2000).
But terms like ‘culture’ and ‘legal culture’ are highly controversial 
(Nelken, 2006d, 2007b). It is often objected that explaining behaviour 
by reference to culture tends to assume that it is determining, bounded 
and unchanging. As compared to seeing it as the ‘cause’ of certain 
behaviours, it is usually better to see culture as a matter of struggle 
and disagreement. The purported uniformity, coherence or stability of 
given national cultures will often be no more than a rhetorical claim 
projected by outside observers, or manipulated by elements within the 
culture concerned. Much that goes under the name of culture is no 
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more – but also no less – than ‘imagined communities’ or ‘invented 
traditions’ (but again these may of course be real in their effects). It 
is essential to avoid reifying national stereotypes. Think, for example, 
of the transformations in elite attitudes towards ‘law and order’ from 
Weimar to Hitlerian Germany. Because of their all-embracing referents, 
cultural explanations run a serious risk of tautology. 
Should we define culture as ‘attitudes, beliefs and values’ and see 
practices as what result from these? This works better when explaining a 
single system as opposed to comparing systems. How should we demar-
cate legal culture from what else is going on? How, if at all, can we draw 
a line between legal culture and ‘institutions’ (Brants and Field, 2000) or 
‘structures’ (Nelken, 2006a). The pioneering work of David Downes on 
Dutch tolerance shows us that as social structure (the system of political 
coordination known as ‘pillarism’) changed, so did cultural attitudes to 
inclusion (Downes, 1988, 2010; Downes and Van Swaaningen, 2007). 
On the other hand, culture can also explain the lack of change. There 
are ironic continuities in the way attempts to purify the state of com-
munism in Poland (in the name of religious and patriotic values) relied 
on patterns of prosecution which were very similar to those used under 
communism (Polak and Nelken, 2010). 
Not surprisingly, reference to culture tends to reproduce the division 
between explanation and interpretation we have been discussing so far 
(and different social science disciplines, such as political science and 
anthropology, also tend to treat it in correspondingly different ways). 
We can use culture to explain differences (Hofstede, 1980) or we can 
seek to explain culture itself. Treated as an explanatory variable, culture 
may be relevant in some cases more than others. As Johnson writes:
In one sense everything is culture, but with respect to capital punish-
ment that approach may not shed much insight on some questions we 
consider important, such as: why China is the world’s execution leader, 
or why ‘other Chinas’ such as Hong Kong and Taiwan have such differ-
ent death penalty policies compared to the PRC, or why North and South 
Korea have such wildly different death penalty policies, or why Hong 
Kong evidenced no backlash against the stoppage of executions or the 
abolition of capital punishment, or why Singapore went through a huge 
execution surge and then a 90% drop in the course of only 15 years, etc. 
(Johnson, email to me, 21/2/2009)
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The interpretative approach, by contrast, treats culture less as a vari-
able than as part of a flow of meaning, ‘the enormous interplay of 
interpretations in and about a culture’ (Friedman, 1994: 73) to which 
social actors, including scholars, also contribute. On this perspective, 
cultural sensibilities, a result of historical contingencies and collec-
tive experiences and memories, support (or can be made to support) 
some action strategies and delegitimate others. Christopher Birkbeck 
has pointed to fundamental differences between the meaning of pris-
ons in North and South America, making reference, inter alia, to con-
trasts in the idea of prison as a warehouse and in the concept of ‘doing 
time’ (Birkbeck and Pérez-Santiago, 2006; Birkbeck, forthcoming). More 
generally, scholars explore the different meanings of the ‘Rule of law’, 
the ‘Rechtsstaat’, and the ‘Stato di diritto’, relate Italian ‘garantismo’ to 
English ‘due process’, or ‘law and order’ to the German ‘innere sicher-
heit’, or probe the meaning of ‘lokale justiz’ as contrasted to ‘community 
crime control’ (Zedner, 1995). 
Even the local idiom may be complex. Edwards and Hughes note that 
‘crime’, ‘harm’, ‘safety’ and ‘security’ might be used interchangeably in 
English-language policy and academic discourse, but they often ‘signify 
competing political constructs of what constitutes order’ (Edwards and 
Hughes, 2005: 346). In Italy, until very recently, the expression adopted 
both in newspapers and academic discussions to describe conventional 
crimes, including even burglary, rape and robbery, was the term ‘micro-
criminality’. This was contrasted with corruption, terrorism and organ-
ised crime, which threatened the state itself – these were the implicit 
but never so denominated macro-crimes. Largely as a result of becoming 
a country of immigration, there is now less tolerance of micro-crime 
and the term increasingly being substituted is the Italian equivalent of 
‘street crime’ or ‘diffuse crime’. Likewise, the past shadows the present. 
In Italy, in the spring of 2009, as part of a new law on security, there 
was much discussion of what role could be found for local-level citizens 
patrols acting in concert with the municipal police. The junior politi-
cal ally in Berlusconi’s coalition, the Northern Leagues, was pressing for 
them to be introduced in the areas under their control. They were happy 
for them to be called ‘le ronde’ despite the term’s fascist connotations. 
But Berlusconi himself expressed a wish that a different name could be 
found to describe the same thing, and proposed ‘associations’.
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The interaction between relatively standardised and more local terms 
can be a valuable area of research. For example, in comparing Italy and 
the UK, the concept of trust – ‘whom do you trust, when do you trust, 
how do you trust, how much do you trust’ – can frame a series of issues 
about variation in matters relevant to criminal justice without using 
terms from given domestic systems. It could help explain and measure 
a range of differences. For example, why it tends to be easier to get a 
job in the UK and the USA, but also easier to lose one as compared to 
Continental Europe, or the ease of collaboration between official agen-
cies as compared to the crime world itself. But at the same time such 
an approach needs to be accompanied by an exploration of the local 
meanings of the word fiducia (trust), as seen, for example, in Italian 
proverbs about the risks of trusting (Nelken, 1994b). 
On the other hand, terms with wider currency can be emptied of or 
changed in their meaning in local contexts. Take the requirement of 
the ‘independence’ of judges from political control. In the early post-
2000 period, the so-called ‘law and justice’ governing party in Poland, 
despite its name, was seen as representing a threat to the autonomy 
of legal institutions. In recent interviews concerning the autonomy of 
prosecutors in Poland in dealing with corruption, we were informed 
in the course of our research that the local quip was that ‘prosecutors’ 
independence means that nothing depends on the prosecutor’ (Polak 
and Nelken, 2010). Terms can also live on, zombie-like, when taken out 
of their usual context, or perhaps given new life, as when the idea of 
prison as a place for re-socialisation is endorsed by transnational bodies 
even though abandoned by some of the national prison administra-
tions they are monitoring.
Whether terms have cross-national applicability has both intellec-
tual and political implications. In his efforts to build global legal theory 
with concepts that can have purchase transnationally, William Twining 
contrasts the terms used in the fight against corruption with those used 
to criticise and raise the standards of prison conditions worldwide. 
Whereas definitions of corruption have only imperfect cross-cultural 
applicability, there has been more success in finding a common lan-
guage for talking about prisoners’ rights (Twining, 2005). One reason 
for this, he suggests, could be that the modern prison, as an institution, 
diffused out from a common origin in the USA. While we can agree 
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in principle that some concepts may, as Twining says, ‘travel well’ as 
compared to others, any given example of this can be controversial. In 
fact, Transparency International seems to be quite successful in impos-
ing some sort of common definition of corruption, while, conversely, 
Birkbeck claims that prison has quite a different meaning in North and 
South America (Birkbeck, forthcoming; Nelken, forthcoming b). Even 
concepts that have no readily obvious local meaning can somehow 
get domesticated, as when the sentencing reform based on the idea 
of ‘three strikes and you are out’ is proposed in places that don’t play 
much baseball! (Jones and Newburn, 2008).
Wider and more local terms are thus not insulated from each other, 
and scholars are among those who play a major and consequential role 
in bringing about their mutual interaction. The influential crimino-
logical notion of ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1972), used to describe alleged 
repressive over-reaction to deviant behaviour, has by now spread across 
Europe and been applied in literature describing increasing concerns 
about street crime in Scandinavia, Spain, Italy, Greece and Japan. The 
local Italian term ‘allarme sociale’ may be subtly different, conjuring 
up as it does less a disproportionate reaction to a threat than the need 
felt by professionals in the legal system to keep distance from emo-
tional over-reactions. But increasingly the two terms are merging. The 
Japanese have two words for scandal: shuba, meaning disgusting news, 
and sukyandaru, essentially an imported word designed to capture 
Western meanings (West, 2009: 7). If people in Russia learn to think of 
the policing they experience as ‘predatory policing’, their attitude to 
the police is likely to change (Gerber and Mendelson, 2008).
The Italian examples that I have been using in this book also illus-
trate the need for interpretation, as well as the challenges of invoking 
culture (and legal culture) in understanding systems of criminal justice. 
Take the measure which means that young people (in a sense) ‘get away 
with murder’. The ministerial website proudly speaks of near 80 per 
cent success of the messa alla prova pre-trial probation disposal used for 
these and other crimes, and urges all juvenile courts to make more use 
of it. But it is not referring to the internationally standardised criterion 
of a two-year period of non-offending following a disposal, but only to 
the number of cases that are held to have been a success by the judges 
at the end of the measure itself. In practice it is only in the most serious 
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cases of non-compliance with this measure that a judge will decide on 
holding a trial, the outcome of which could only be, if conviction follows, 
prison or, more likely, suspended prison. Whatever positive good the 
juvenile justice system has to provide is only on offer in pre-trial proba-
tion. So judges are reluctant to find that youngsters have failed. By con-
trast, the only published attempt in Italy to measure young offender’s 
recidivism after this disposal, albeit only in one court district in north-
ern Italy, came up with a rate of over 40 per cent. Perhaps still accept-
able, but a somewhat different outcome.
Culture is relevant to all three of the running examples I have been 
discussing. The principles adopted in the Italian juvenile justice system 
have to do with the wider culture of the late 1980s, but they also reflect 
more basic features of social structure that help explain why politi-
cal pressure for change has not been able to overcome the resistance 
of those in favour of the current system. The attachment to obliga-
tory prosecution, apart from being enshrined in the constitution, also 
reflects a cultural preoccupation, this time with the risks of personal or 
politicised decision-making. But its survival is now in doubt as recent 
Italian governments of the centre-right try to change the status of pros-
ecutors by distinguishing them more sharply from judges and, more 
subtly, by detaching the loyalties of the police that prosecutors need to 
use in their tasks. Court delays, finally, parallel other cultural patterns 
which privilege procedure over substance. But they also ensure that – at 
least in the short and medium term – it is usually more rational for an 
individual to rely on existing forms of clientalist dependence rather 
than turn to legal remedies.
FOur
explaining too much?
The major current debate in comparative criminal justice has to do with 
how best to explain the current growth in so-called ‘punitiveness’ – or 
willingness to punish – as evidenced especially in the rise in imprison-
ment rates. It has generated a considerable literature, to which I shall 
only be able to make limited reference here. But this chapter is in any 
case intended less to contribute to this debate than to comment on it. 
I seek to throw further light on some of the central questions in com-
parative criminal justice that I have been discussing so far – the differ-
ences between the tasks of description, explanation and interpretation, 
the part played by criminal procedure in explaining penal outcomes, 
the problems of comparing like with like and, not least, the dangers of 
ethnocentrism.
The debate over punitiveness 
The puzzle at the heart of this chapter is well captured by leading penol-
ogist Michael Tonry when he writes that: ‘punishment and crime have 
little to do with each other. That observation is a commonplace for 
most European criminologists, some North American criminologists, 
and very few politicians’ (Tonry, 2005). In their search for compara-
ble data, scholars of comparative criminal justice have been among the 
pioneers of those seeking to obtain a more faithful picture about crime 
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levels through asking samples of potential victims in different countries 
to report their experiences, rather than relying on the cases that happen 
to get recorded in official statistics (Van Dijk et al., 2007). Their findings 
show that punishment has continued to rise even when crime levels are 
decreasing and that, cross-nationally, the levels of crime and punishment 
do not correlate well. 
Apart from victim surveys, other methods also show that, recently, 
punishment has been rising while crime has remained stable. For exam-
ple, Felipe Estrada ingeniously demonstrated that the nature of injuries 
in crime incidents reported in hospital casualty rooms in Stockholm 
stayed the same even as police definition of such injuries became more 
serious, hence leading to greater punishment (Estrada, 2006). Though 
less stressed at the present time, the opposite is also true. Punishment 
levels do not always follow rising crime. As late as 1990, scholars of 
comparative criminal justice described the dominant trend as one 
towards more lenient punishment and the ‘defining-down’ of deviance 
(Haferkampf and Ellis, 1992). Before taking Tonry’s words literally (or 
out of context), however, more would need to be said about the oppo-
site question of possible effects of changes in punishment on crime 
levels. Few criminologists would deny that there is some relationship, 
even if it is far from linear. Nonetheless, almost all criminologists agree 
that – even in the USA – only a small part of the recent reduction in 
crime can be attributed to the increasing use of prison.
Comparison of the willingness to punish between states within the 
USA, as well as between nation-states, has a long pedigree. Paradoxically, 
however, the recent stimulus to comparative work came about in large 
part because of the influential analysis offered by David Garland of 
the connections between the rise of punishment and widespread late-
modern changes in social and economic conditions, including expo-
sure of the middle classes to ‘high crime’ rates (Garland, 2001). Garland 
offered a rich, but pessimistic, account of the way ‘penal welfarism’ 
had been displaced by the politicisation of crime and the growth of 
popular punitiveness. He noted, for example, the privileging of public 
protection and the claim that ‘prison works’, and described the changes 
in the emotional tone of crime policy from decency and humanity to 
insecurity, anger and resentment. But he gave little attention to differ-
ences between countries. Thus the question arose: did his analysis hold 
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generally? There is some evidence that the thesis is widely applicable, 
or at least (what is not exactly the same thing) that ‘the culture of con-
trol’ is spreading like a firestorm (Waquant, 2009a). For example, the 
Netherlands, once a ‘beacon of tolerance’, is seen as going in this direc-
tion (Downes and Van Swaaningen, 2007; Downes, 2010). And even 
Japan is now changing its criminal justice system to respond to political 
and popular calls for more severity (Fenwick, 2005; Miyazawa, 2008). 
But others deny that there has been any such general turn to puni-
tiveness and argue that we can and must avoid assuming that Europe 
is also bound to end up with something like the American dystopia, 
with its bloated penal system that now embraces more than two mil-
lion prisoners (Zedner, 2002). In Ireland, to take only one example, 
the use of prison was eight times higher in the 1950s than fifty years 
later (O’Sullivan and O’Donnell, 2007). Nor is there any earlier golden 
age to set against the present once we take into account that ‘wel-
fare’ in the context of criminal justice is also a form of social con-
trol (Mathews, 2005) and that it still forms a central part of current 
‘volatile and contradictory’ practices (O’Malley, 1999). Tonry himself 
insists that ‘(m)any of the generalizations bandied about in discussions 
of penal policy in Western countries are not true’. Populism or popu-
list punitiveness, if it exists at all, he says, ‘is mostly as reifications in 
academics’ minds of other academics’ ideas’. Imprisonment rates have 
not risen substantially everywhere in the last fifteen years. Some penal 
policies in some places have become harsher, but in most places this is 
offset by changes in practice that moderate and sometimes nullify the 
policy changes, and by other policy changes that move in the opposite 
direction (Tonry, 2007a: 1). 
From this perspective, what Garland and others are describing 
is something principally tied to the political and legal culture of the 
USA. What we need to explore are the differences between the USA 
and Europe, and even within Europe, differences that suggest that there 
are multiple cultures of control rather than just one ‘culture of control’ 
(Pratt et al., 2005). Certainly the numbers in prison in the US are out of 
all proportion to other Western countries, even if the rise of the prison 
archipelago is fundamentally a phenomenon of the last thirty years and 
there are enormous differences even now between some of its constitu-
ent states and others (Hinds, 2005; Newburn, 2006). Explanatory factors 
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that are particularly relevant to the USA range from the importance 
of racial divisions, the history of the frontier, attitudes to gun owner-
ship, the role of elected judges and prosecutors, the need for politicians 
such as state governors to take a hard line against crime so as to have a 
chance of getting into power, and the influence of single-issue pressure 
groups at the federal level. The absence of such factors helps explain 
why other places have less people in prison. In addition, in explaining 
why other countries have lower prison rates, we must consider their 
‘shields’ against punitiveness. There seems to be a strong link between 
the level of social inequality and (other) negative social consequences 
(Wilkinson, 1996). Savelsberg offers a triangular comparison of the 
USA, West Germany and Poland that highlights the role of strong state 
bureaucracies, centralised and decentralised administration of justice, 
and institutions of knowledge production and diffusion (Savelsberg, 
1994, 1999). 
The political economy of punitiveness
But the debate on which factors are the key to explaining punitiveness 
is far from settled. In the rest of this chapter I offer a critical discussion 
of just one recent contribution to this debate. In their innovative work, 
Cavadino and Dignan try to straddle generalising and particularising 
approaches so as to explain both why punitiveness has been growing 
and why it is by no means a uniform development (Cavadino and Dignan, 
2006a, 2006b). Their argument has been much praised by other lead-
ing writers in Great Britain, who, like them, are also concerned to stop 
the dangerous slide in England and Wales towards an ever-expanding 
prison system. In the rest of this chapter I first summarise their claims, 
then consider what their comparison holds ‘constant’, and the plau-
sibility of the independent and dependent variables that make up the 
structure of their explanation. I then go on to argue for the need for 
a more interpretative approach to notions such as punitiveness and 
tolerance.
Cavadino and Dignan reject common-sense explanations such as 
differences in crime levels or in public attitudes towards sentences as 
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the reason for variations in prison rates. Instead, they build on prior 
neo-Marxist analyses of the role of the prison in relation to the labour 
force (for a recent example, see De Georgi, 2007), as well as classifica-
tions of welfare typologies in the social policy literature, claiming that 
political economy, and in particular the influence of neo-liberalism, 
offers the key to differences in punitiveness as measured by the num-
bers of people in prison. I have reproduced in Table 4.1 the data that 
they see as supporting their thesis. This shows us that the rates in 
twelve modern industrial societies vary considerably and consistently 
between what they call neo-liberal, conservative-corporatist, social-
democratic and oriental-corporatist types of political economy. The 
updating of their figures (the numbers in brackets) also indicates that 
these striking differences have remained pretty stable over the past 
few years.
Table 4.1  Imprisonment rates per 100,000 in 12 countries 
(2002/031 and 20082)
Neo-liberal countries
USA 701 (756)
South Africa 402 (334)
New Zealand  155 (185)
England and Wales 141 (152)
Australia 115 (129)
Conservative-corporatist countries
Italy 100 (92)
Germany 98 (89)
The Netherlands 100 (100)
France 93 (96)
Social-democratic countries
Sweden 73 (74)
Finland 70 (64)
Oriental-corporatist countries
Japan 53 (63)
1 Source: Cavadino and Dignan, 2006a: 22.
2 The figures in brackets are updated from those in their book. 
Source: www.kcl.ac.UK/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/
wpb_stats.php (accessed 12/01/2010). See the latest figures at the 
site of the International Centre for Prison Studies.
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At the risk of over-simplification, their claim can be summarised as 
follows. Neo-liberal societies have the highest prison rates because they 
follow social and economic policies that lead to what they describe as 
‘exclusionary cultural attitudes towards our deviant and marginalised 
fellow citizens’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006a: 23. Emphasis added). 
On the other hand, Continental European corporatist societies and, 
even more, Scandinavia social-democratic societies, ‘pursue more inclu-
sive economic and social policies that give citizens more protection 
from unfettered market forces’. These societies ‘see offenders as need-
ing resocialisation which is the responsibility of the community as a 
whole’ (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006a: 24 Emphasis added). Stated like 
this, Cavadino and Dignan’s thesis fits well into the mainstream style 
of explanatory work in comparative criminal justice that tries to tie 
together explanatory variables and punishment outcomes. Their book, 
however, also draws on the views of selected locally-based experts so as 
fill in what they call missing ‘idiosyncratic’ detail. But they conclude 
that this does not require them to modify their overall thesis. 
Cavadino and Dignan, like most of those comparing a large range of 
incarceration rates, spend little time on persuading us that crime rates 
are really the same in all the countries they are comparing. But it is 
this, the assumption that crime levels are ‘constant’ in the places being 
compared, that sets the puzzle they are trying to solve. How can some 
societies live with high crime rates without concomitant expansion of 
the prison realm? If countries with higher prison rates were actually 
dealing with higher threats from crime, this would not be news, and 
we could hardly say that we were fairly comparing levels of punitiveness. 
(Rather, we would be showing how neo-liberalism increases both crime 
and punishment.) On the other hand, it is strange that the good things 
about more inclusive welfare-oriented or egalitarian social-democratic 
societies do not also reduce the level, or severity, of crimes being com-
mitted, rather than only shaping the response to them. And since our 
ideal is presumably to live in places that have both low levels of punish-
ment and low crime it is a pity that this inconvenient point is passed 
over so quickly.
In fact, there are reasons to think that some of the places in their 
table with higher prison rates do have higher levels of crime. The USA 
certainly has more lethal violence than any of the other countries in 
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their list and South Africa too suffers exceptional levels of homicide, 
violence and rape. Victim surveys show that England and Wales has 
higher rates of burglary. One comparison of overall victimisation rates 
for ten crimes places England and Wales top, with the Scandinavian 
countries and Japan the lowest (Van Dijk, 2007: 158). As with all official 
statistics, what lies behind and produces overall prison rates needs to 
be studied empirically and carefully disentangled. It is important to see 
who is in prison, for what crimes, and how they arrived there. Many of 
the countries that have lower rates, Sweden for example, or Switzerland, 
or the Netherlands in its glorious period, use shorter prison terms but 
actually send relatively more people to prison than those with higher 
overall rates. Does this show less punitiveness than sending fewer peo-
ple for longer periods? It certainly complicates any argument we may 
want to make about punitiveness and inclusiveness. 
According to the 2006 figures, Italy had the lowest prison popula-
tion among the larger European countries. But the explanation for this 
does not lie with the generosity of its welfare or work training systems 
(welfare payments mainly go to pay pensions). It owed everything to 
an indulto or collective pardon, which freed over a third of its prison 
inmates just before the Council of Europe collected its data. Its prison 
population is now again rising and is predicted to reach pre-indulto 
levels shortly. This may be a particularly striking example, but it can be 
difficult, perhaps even fruitless, to try to purify comparative figures of 
such external interventions. Finland, which, post-Second World War, 
had one of the highest prison rates, deliberately brought its figures down 
so as to be more in line with its Scandinavian neighbours (Von Hofer, 
2003). Such volatility is not easy to reconcile with claims about the 
dependence of prison rates on underlying basic differences in political 
economy. 
Cavadino and Dignan’s thesis about neo-liberalism is certainly a plau-
sible candidate to be part of the explanation for the recent increase in 
prison rates, as well as a factor in explaining differences between places. 
But their argument may not apply so well outside the range of countries 
they compare. There are countries (such as China) which make a high 
use of prison without being neo-liberal, and others, such as Russia or 
South Africa, where moves towards neo-liberalism have actually gone 
together with some reduction in the use of prison. This suggests that 
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a wider variety of variables than those connected to political economy 
may also lead to high or lower punitiveness. More interesting, perhaps, 
in relation to the countries they selected, it could also be argued that 
their explanation risks being tautological, showing that it may not 
always be easy to draw a line between classification, description and the 
allegedly more powerful strategy of explanation. It is hardly surprising 
to find that neo-liberalism in the USA and Europe correlates with exclu-
sionary attitudes towards offenders, given that Cavadino and Dignan 
themselves actually define neo-liberalism as including such attitudes, as 
well as justifying the diversion of spending from welfare to the criminal 
justice system (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006b: 15, Table 1). They explain 
that there are differences between the countries they compare in terms 
of two other dependent variables: the degree to which they have pri-
vate prisons and the age of onset of criminal responsibility. But again, 
it could be objected that the former factor is just another expression of 
neo-liberalism and even the latter has to do with the individualism that 
is an ingredient of all forms of liberalism. 
For some commentators, other independent variables need to be 
added to those identified by Cavadino and Dignan. Lacey (2008), for 
example, fully accepts that what she calls ‘societies with coordinated 
market economies’ are indeed less punitive. But she argues that we 
should also consider the way multi-party political systems with propor-
tional voting see less resort to populist politics than two-party systems, 
and rightly recommends that we take into account the influence of the 
long-established constitutional and legal frameworks in which criminal 
justice systems are embedded. Lacey admits, however, that the specifici-
ties of different societies can cause problems for her thesis. New Zealand 
has one of the harshest penal dispensations despite its multi-party system. 
And once we recognise that different variables may be relevant in differ-
ent societies, a table comparing prison rates can easily obscure as much 
as it reveals. Some of the Scandinavian countries with low prison rates 
have experienced little immigration; others even have long-standing 
blocks on economic migration. Can this be ignored? 
Are the Netherlands and Italy really similarly punitive – and for simi-
lar reasons of political economy? What of social control outside criminal 
justice? Not for nothing, Cavadino and Dignan entitle their chapter on 
Japan ‘Iron fist in a velvet glove’. As far as the Italian case is concerned, 
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Cavadino and Dignan are right to stress the importance of corporatist 
rather than market structures. But it could be just as important to think 
about religion. Likewise there is the continuing centrality in Italy not 
only of the family and extended family, especially important with respect 
to the handling of juvenile delinquency, but also of family-like groups in 
maintaining social order in many sectors of public and private life. Some 
of those helping to maintain ‘order’ in the southern regions (and hence 
keeping prison rates low) are actually criminal groups. 
For Tonry himself, it is politics with all its contradictions, rather 
than political economy, that is the master variable, both for explain-
ing America’s exceptional prison rates and differences within Europe 
(Tonry, 2001, 2007a). Certainly, if we again consider the Italian case, 
politics seems a very significant variable. Few national politicians (other 
than those on the far right) sought in the past to exploit populist fear 
about crime for electoral advantage in the face of their own vulner-
ability to prosecution, the widespread popular distrust of the state, and 
reluctance to see it as too powerful. There is also, not least, the some-
what different status of victims in a Catholic country where they are 
expected to forgive more than to authorise revenge. But the independ-
ent variable that most directly explains Cavadino and Dignan’s find-
ings, in Italy and elsewhere, is to be found not at the level of the wider 
society and its politics but in the quotidian practices shaped by criminal 
procedure. All systems of criminal justice are to some degree intended 
to be selective in the cases that are taken on to trial and penalty, but 
they differ among themselves (and over time) in the way they construct 
and operate such selectivity. In Italy, for example, it is the attrition 
rate of cases as they go through the long and complex requirements of 
criminal procedure that is particularly striking. 
As the three aspects of Italian penal procedure that I have been using 
as running examples well illustrate, many cases start out but few arrive 
at a conclusion. The 1989 innovations in juvenile justice procedure 
were brought in as a way of holding up trial. Obligatory prosecution 
too can end up contributing to court delays and cases becoming ‘pre-
scribed’ and thus time-bound. And court delay speaks for itself. The 
typical procedural guarantees of the adversarial system (centring on 
the forensic contest of the trial) that were introduced in the principal 
1989 reform of criminal procedure, were simply added to the ones that 
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belong to the inquisitorial tradition. Even quite minor cases go through 
a series of procedural hoops and are reviewed by a large number of 
judges, and there are two stages of appeal (the first stage being a retrial 
on the facts). There are complex rules about informing the accused 
and his lawyers of trial hearings at each stage of the proceedings and 
extensive periods are allowed for them to prepare their defence each 
time. It is not infrequent for such notifications to go astray, especially 
where there is more than one accused and lawyer involved. Uniquely, 
the so-called ‘prescription’, statute of limitations period, after which 
criminal proceedings become null and void, continues to run until the 
Cassation court has given its final verdict. On the other hand, illegal 
immigrants, especially those ‘caught in the act’ of committing crimes, 
are unable to take advantage of many of the routine procedural benefits 
of the system, and it is these, mainly property offenders, who, together 
with low-level drug dealers, now tend to fill the prisons. 
But is Italy just a special case? (As Mrs Thatcher liked to say, when 
characterising various countries in the European Union, ‘and then 
there’s Italy’). Its politics may be somewhat unusual, but criminal pro-
cedure and case attrition is also a large part of the explanation of how 
other countries with low prison rates kept them low in the past, or still 
do so. Germany, for example, diverts around half of its prosecutions, 
and France in the 1980s and 1990s repeatedly resorted to amnesties 
as a response to prison overcrowding (Lévy, 2007; Roche, 2007). The 
Netherlands and Switzerland used to send offenders home to wait until 
places were ready for them in prison. Yet the more we emphasise the 
role of criminal procedure as an explanation in its own right, the more 
it becomes difficult to draw a line between independent variables and 
the dependent variable – prison rates – that independent variables are 
intended to explain. In fact, it has been argued that the whole basis 
of relying on incarceration rates as measures of punitiveness is simply 
mistaken and it only makes sense to compare prison rates per number 
of people actually prosecuted (Pease, 1994). 
On the other hand, the importance of socio-political variables could 
be reaffirmed by arguing that criminal procedure merely represents the 
means used to express underlying leniency (and similar issues of ‘why’ 
versus ‘how’ could of course also be raised regarding other variables, 
for example the role of the media.) What happens within the criminal 
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justice system is certainly often linked to other aspects of political and 
social structure, even if this may not be easy to grasp without some 
inside knowledge. Lacey, for example, suggests that in Europe it is col-
laboration between politicians, policy-makers and courts that keeps 
prison rates down (Lacey, 2008). But Italian experience suggests that 
it can be refusal of such collaboration that leads to the same result, 
as many judges and prosecutors seek to resist efforts by politicians to 
encourage the mass criminalisation of illegal immigrants (Montana and 
Nelken, forthcoming). As this suggests, it is best to see criminal pro-
cedure as a semi-autonomous variable in its own right, constraining 
as well as being shaped by larger factors. There are crucial differences 
between common law and continental countries with regard to how 
far it is thought right for criminal justice to be insulated or responsive to 
political direction or to social expectations. And it is the breaking down 
of such ideas about autonomy that is bringing about change in Europe 
and Japan.
The meanings of tolerance
Whatever difficulties there may be in correctly identifying the rel-
evant independent variables that can explain variations in punitive-
ness and tolerance, it can be even more important to think about the 
cross-national meaning of dependent variables such as punitiveness, 
leniency and tolerance. What turns punishment into punitiveness? 
Are we talking of neutral ‘facts’ or of value judgements, and whose 
judgements count or should count? Can there be too little punish-
ment? Is tolerance always good? To what sort of behaviour are these 
terms being applied? It has been argued that, in late modernity, toler-
ance for some kinds of deviance (for example, sexual deviance) may 
have increased, but that there is now less willingness to reform and 
reintegrate those who engage in offending (Young, 1999). In the Neth-
erlands the differences between the two kinds of tolerance and the 
way they have evolved recently is well evidenced by the late Pim For-
tuyn’s flamboyant display of an alternative sexual lifestyle combined 
with his insistence on the threat represented by Muslim immigration. 
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But there are important variations in this process from place to place, 
with Scandinavian countries currently tending to integrate offenders 
but moralise about deviance, and disapproval of offending may often 
be a covert way of refusing difference. 
Are punishment and tolerance on the same or on different con-
tinua? Is tolerance the name we give to the outcome of intentional 
choices, for example the willingness to organise welfare interventions? 
Or is it an alternative to such interventions – just the name we give to 
deliberate or even negligent non-enforcement of available sanctions? 
If punitiveness and tolerance are deliberate strategies, who is it that 
is pursuing them – politicians, legal professionals, the public – or all 
of these? How do they influence each other? Can we speak sensibly 
about punitiveness and tolerance in different cultures without specify-
ing what the actors in each of the societies concerned mean by these 
terms? Admittedly, this is not the only approach we can take. If we 
are imposing judgements from the outside, it could be acceptable to 
describe behaviour as more or less punitive – just as we can say behav-
iour is more or less racist – even if the actors would not necessarily rec-
ognise such a description of their behaviour. But Cavadino and Dignan 
offer their analysis as an attempt to grasp what those involved think 
they are trying to achieve. Can it be irrelevant that what I call tolerance 
you call permissiveness, indulgence, favouritism, neglect, indifference, 
impunity, denial or collusion (Nelken, 2006a, 2006b)? What if toler-
ance of others committing crime is a result of a lack of civicness and 
minding one’s own business?
There is a very large literature on public attitudes to crime (see e.g. 
Beckett, 1997; Roberts and Hough, 2005). Cavadino and Dignan, how-
ever, rule out the obvious short-cut of arguing that it is simply differ-
ences in public attitudes to criminals that provides the explanation of 
differences in incarceration rates. They provide a table that relates the 
punitiveness scores of the general public (measured by whether the sen-
tence they consider the appropriate punishment for a crime coincides 
with that typically imposed by the courts) to the position of the coun-
try concerned in the rank order of those sending offenders to prison 
(Cavadino and Dignan, 2006b: 30, Table 1.3). This throws up some 
problem cases. The public in Japan is more punitive than the typical 
sentences handed down, whereas people in New Zealand or France are 
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less so. But even if the correlation between public attitudes and the 
incarceration rate is not perfect, in most of the countries in their list 
public expectations and court sentences are in fact roughly in line with 
each other. Van Dijk, too, argues ‘in the western world, the countries 
where the public clearly favours imprisonment, such as the USA and 
the UK, tend to have comparatively higher prisoners rates’ (Van Dijk, 
2007: 150–1; see also Solivetti, 2010). 
The question remains where these attitudes come from. Do they 
produce harshness or result from it? At the level of elites there is some 
evidence that the creation of punitive outcomes can be more or less 
intentional. From their public pronouncements it would seem that many 
leaders in the USA are against ‘forgiveness’, and politicians there and in 
the UK are less concerned with keeping prison rates down than with 
finding ways of reducing crime and problematic behaviour. Italians, on 
the other hand, were leaders in the international decarceration move-
ment (which aimed to have mental patients and others treated in the 
community rather than in total institutions). In general political dis-
cussions, Italian commentators do speak a great deal about ‘solidarity’ 
as a way of referring to inclusion. But, in the context of criminal justice, 
they tend to speak less about being ‘tolerant’ than of the need to subject 
the criminal process to strict procedural requirements or garanzie. 
As elsewhere, however, there is now rising criticism (mobilised both 
by some politicians and parts of the media) of the ‘tolerance’ of every-
day crime that is consequent on attrition in the penal process. Notice 
is drawn to the ‘inexplicable’ way in which even alleged serious crimi-
nals can find themselves still at large while awaiting trial, or benefit in 
other ways from what seem like excessive procedural formalities. Such 
rethinking is seen in the increasing currency of terms like buonismo 
(pretentious generosity at others’ expense), perdonismo (being too ready 
to forgive everything), or garanzie pelose (so-called ‘hairy’ procedural 
guarantees that are seen as measures pretending to protect the rights of 
the accused, but really aiming to create a system whereby it will be pos-
sible, if needed, to get certain accused people off the hook at all costs). 
As this reminds us, an investigation of local concepts can provide 
clues to differences in approaches to punitiveness. What the Dutch call 
gedogen, or guided tolerance, does not correspond to the English term 
‘tolerance’ because that can also be passive whereas the Dutch concept 
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refers to an open-eyed tolerance – a matter of government policy. In 
Italy, on the other hand, the state could never explicitly approve such 
accommodation because of the fear that the law will then be bent to 
the interests of those who wish to achieve immunity for their own 
misdeeds while targeting their opponents. Italy’s inclusiveness thus has 
less to do with the guiding role of the regulatory state than it does with 
attitudes of low respect for the legality mandated by the national state, 
combined with a cultural emphasis on forgiveness, solidarity and frater-
nalism deriving from current local interpretations of a strong Catholic 
heritage and left-wing ideologies. ‘Tolerance’ as non-enforcement comes 
about de facto because the legislative body tends to multiply offences at 
the same time as doing nothing about the considerable difficulties that 
exist when it comes to enforcing them. Sometimes government impo-
tence may also merge into collusion with elite crime – what has been 
described as ‘ruling through leniency’ (Melossi, 1994). Sometimes, lax-
ity in enforcing rules and readiness to accept amends after the event is 
used as a way of currying popular support. 
Could such differences sustain the claims of cultural relativism? We 
are told, for example, that the term gedogen is not readily translatable 
into English or any other language. ‘The term is Dutch, the concept is 
Dutch, and its application only works in Holland’ (website of the philos-
ophy department of Erasmus University in Rotterdam). But this misses 
the point that penal approaches are highly contested and changeable 
even within the societies concerned. Despite ‘ruling through leniency’, 
Italy has also seen major investigations against political corruption 
and considerable successes in the fight against the Mafia. And critical 
reassessment in the Netherlands of the virtues of gedogen has clearly 
affected the possibility of keeping prison rates down – and the desire to 
do so (Buruma, 2007).
To conclude: this chapter has illustrated some of the challenges in 
combining both explanatory and interpretative approaches to compar-
ative criminal justice. We have seen that no search for common factors 
to explain differences in prison rates can do justice to all the differ-
ences between individual countries. More qualitative and interpretative 
approaches, relying on other methods and generating other kinds of 
data thus provide an essential supplement and corrective to the claims 
of mainstream work. We have also seen that, if we are to come close to 
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grasping successfully what other systems of criminal justice are actually 
trying to do, we need to see them ‘warts and all’. We should be care-
ful not to deduce intentions from the outcomes being achieved on 
the basis of what we imagine they should be doing – even if these are 
the best of intentions – and even if it is often tempting – especially 
for the purposes of advancing a given agenda in local debates – to do 
just that. As far as Italy is concerned, it can be questioned how far their 
ways of reducing numbers in prison can rightly be described as expres-
sions of ‘inclusion’ or tolerance (with the partial exception of the treat-
ment of youth offenders), especially as these ‘shields’ turn out to be of 
little help where immigrants are concerned. 
five
the challenge of the global
The ‘units’ that we seek to compare undergo change over time, often 
as a result of external influences. For some writers, the transformations 
currently being produced by globalisation go so far as to put into ques-
tion the comparative project. Katja Aas, author of a superb recent intro-
duction to ‘crime and globalisation’, argues that ‘one can no longer 
study, for example, Italy by simply looking at what happens inside its 
territory, but rather need to acknowledge the effects that distant con-
flicts and developments have on national crime and security concerns 
and vice versa’ (Aas, 2007: 286). Not surprisingly, therefore, she devotes 
little energy to problems of comparing individual countries, and instead 
seeks to show us the complex processes by which the ‘global’ and ‘the 
local’ are intertwined. In this chapter I argue that comparative crimi-
nal justice must indeed take global and other cross-national intercon-
nections into account, but that it also offers an essential contribution 
to understanding such developments. I begin by saying more about 
globalisation and its implications and then focus on case studies of 
attempts to bring about greater similarities in systems of criminal justice 
(hence reducing the apparent need for comparison of differences). 
Globalisation and comparative  
criminal justice
Even if we limit ourselves to the narrow question of the implica-
tions of globalisation for comparative criminal justice, the literature 
 comparative criminal justice72
is overwhelming. Some issues have to do with questions of classification, 
such as need to define globalisation in relation to related trends such 
as late-modernity and neo-liberalism, Americanisation or Europe-
anization, ‘liquid modernity’, the move to ‘network society’ or the 
rise of the ‘risk society’. Others are more descriptive and empirical. 
What is going on in the various spheres of society and criminal 
justice that globalisation is said to be affecting? Where are influen-
tial norms, scripts, ideas, practices and institutions coming from? 
Then there are explanatory questions, for example can transna-
tional policing be seen as part of the creation a new world order (or 
rival world orders)? Finally, there are evaluative questions, such as 
where should ideas be taken from? How much should diversity be 
respected, why, by whom, and when? 
As a consequence of the greater mobility of capital (sometimes but 
not always embraced as a neo-liberal choice) new forms of interna-
tional interconnections grow at the expense of national or more local 
ones. ‘Governance’ increasingly replaces government, and power is 
increasingly shared with other transnational and private actors. Hence 
many key crime initiatives now link regional or local centres of power 
(Edwards and Hughes, 2005) or are delegated to the private sector. As 
it increasingly blurs the differences between ‘units’, globalisation also 
reshapes spaces, the meaning of place, and the location and signifi-
cance of boundaries. It becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the 
‘inside’ from the ‘outside’. New units emerge as objects and as agents 
of control. We can think, for example, of the internationalisation of 
policing (Deflem, 2002) or attempts by international courts of justice 
to enforce on states common minimal standards of conduct. The same 
applies to the increasing blurring between war-making, peacekeeping 
and criminal justice. At the same time, the use of cyberspace requires 
and generates a variety of forms of control, and may point to new (not 
necessarily utopian) forms of social ordering.
Comparative criminal justice textbooks and collections are under-
standably uncertain about how to integrate such transnational devel-
opments into their classificatory and descriptive schemes. Material that 
fits awkwardly into the traditional comparative paradigm is sometimes 
relegated to a separate book (Reichel, 2007), to an early chapter (Reichel, 
2008), or a closing one (Dammer, Fairchild and Albanese, 2005). Titles 
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such as Winterdyk and Cao’s Lessons from International/Comparative 
Criminology/Criminal Justice signal the various topics that are being 
dealt with, but without saying how, if at all, they may be connected 
(Winterdyk and Cao, 2004). In their collection, Sheptycki and Wardak 
have separate sections distinguishing ‘area studies’, from ‘transna-
tional crime issues’ and ‘transnational control responses’ (Sheptycki 
and Wardak, 2005), but they admit that it is difficult to know when 
an account of a country’s criminal justice system should focus more 
on internal factors or on external influences. It may be plausible that 
the chapter on Saudi Arabia treats the country as autonomous, though 
it also does have a pan-Islamic mission, but it is less obvious why the 
chapter on South Africa focuses so much on internal developments, 
whereas the chapter on West Africa is all about its vulnerability to the 
outside world. 
Aas is not the only one who thinks that old-style comparative crim-
inal justice has had its day. In their Global Criminology and Criminal 
Justice, Larsen and Smandych argue that the
cross-cultural study of crime and justice has evolved from a ‘comparative’ or 
‘international’ approach to what is now increasingly referred to as a ‘tran-
snational’ or ‘global’ approach to crime and justice. … The effects of rapid 
globalisation have changed social, political, and legal realities in such a way 
that comparative and international approaches to crime and justice are inad-
equate to capture the full complexity of these issues on a global scale.
In particular, they draw attention to ‘global trends in policing and 
security, convergence and divergence in criminal justice and penal policy, 
and international criminal justice, war crimes and the global protection 
of human rights’ (Larsen and Smandych, 2008: xi). Globalisation has 
consequences for the economic fortunes of countries, cities, or parts of 
them, so that ordinary crime problems, and not only those perpetrated 
by transnational criminal organisations, often have little to do with the 
unit in which they are located. The same goes for ‘solutions’ to perceived 
threats. Aas points out that Norway relies on Italy to keep out unwanted 
immigrants that might otherwise reach its territory, but it is Italy that 
then risks international opprobrium in blocking or incarcerating them.
On the other hand, Piers Beirne, in his preface to Larsen and 
Smandych, warns against going too far. He concedes that globalisation 
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and transnational crime ‘blur the relatively distinct boundaries and 
mobilities that exist between nations and between sovereign territo-
ries’, but argues that ‘comparative criminology still has a vital role to 
play, both in its own terms and also adjacent to global criminology and 
as one of its key constituents ... the question of how globalisation and 
transnational crime affect different societies – similarly or differently, 
both similarly or differently at the same time, or somewhere in between – 
is first and foremost a comparative one’ (Beirne, 2008: ix). He tells that 
there is also a valuable role for comparative criminology, for example, 
in identifying which (failed) states are more vulnerable to the penetra-
tion of transnational organised crime – places where there are corrupt 
politicians, weak controls, lengthy borders, and so on.
The significance of transnational connections can be well illustrated 
if we revisit the question of explaining why different nation-states 
have different prison rates. In the last chapter we accepted, for the sake 
of argument, the distinction between nation-state ‘units’ presupposed 
by Cavadino and Dignan. But can we really be sure that what hap-
pens in the places they discuss are independent of one other and thus 
explicable by local economic, social and political factors? Cavadino 
and Dignan are not unaware of globalisation. They see their findings 
as proving that differences ‘persist’ despite its effects. But perhaps we 
then need to say that what they are describing are not so much intrin-
sic policy differences in the way states choose to deal with marginal 
citizens but differential ways of responding to a similar transnational 
trend, or even the variable results of the marketing and imitation of 
an American model of penality. 
This alternative perspective complicates any explanation of puni-
tiveness. Neo-liberalism would be seen as an index of the weakening 
of nation-states. The rise of punitiveness, for example, could reflect 
attempts by states to reassert their sovereignty, at least as a form of sym-
bolic ‘acting-out’ (Garland, 1996), or, possibly, as a successful aspect of 
the restructuring of the regulation of poverty by the neo-liberal penal 
state (Waquant, 2009a, 2009b). On the other hand, neo-liberalism is not 
the only transnational trend to affect such rates. The vogue for import-
ing elements of the adversarial process, or for extending more protec-
tion to women, can also be relevant. Moreover, southern European 
countries, which are the places most likely to incarcerate large numbers 
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of immigrants, are not those most influenced by neo-liberalism and its 
route to a ‘new punitiveness’ (Solivetti, 2010). 
More generally, prison rates need to be seen not only as measures 
describing the operations of different criminal justice systems – the 
result of thousands of loosely coordinated local decisions – but also as 
social artefacts at the centre of wider struggles about changing penal 
practices. In fact, the adviser to the United Nations, whose figures were 
the source of Cavadino and Dignan’s table, urges all countries, irrespec-
tive of their kind of political economy, to shape their criminal justice prac-
tices so as to aim at a rate of no more than a hundred prisoners per 
hundred thousand of the population (Walmsley, 1999). (Interestingly, 
his recommendations of how to reach this goal include avoiding short 
prison sentences, even though it is the countries with the lowest rates 
that tend to be the ones that make most use of these.)
Globalisation is just one of the factors leading to the alleged end 
of the state monopoly over criminal justice (Drake, Muncie and 
Westmorland, 2010a and b). But it is important to remember that 
processes of mutual contacts and influence did not start with what is 
called globalisation. Ideas and practices of criminal justice have always 
circulated between countries and elites. A previous generation spoke 
of convergence coming about as a result of the similar technological 
requirements of industrial societies, and the role of empire and coloni-
alism has also been fundamental in shaping criminal justice systems. 
Thus, quite apart from the effects of globalisation, the running exam-
ples from Italy discussed in this book are only in very limited respects 
‘intrinsically’ Italian. The modern juvenile justice system was initially 
borrowed from England and Wales (Lemert, 1986). Obligatory pros-
ecution is a practice held in common with some other continental 
countries, such as Austria, even if it is now an increasingly alien ele-
ment in a criminal procedure remodelled in Italy in 1989 according 
to the Anglo-American scheme. Court delays (not in fact a problem 
in Mussolini’s time) have been exacerbated by the introduction of the 
adversarial procedure because its protections have been added to the 
previous guarantees for the accused. 
None of this borrowing is best described in terms of globalisation. 
Nor does it prove that comparison should cease to make reference to 
nation-states. It would be premature to say that the nation-state has 
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had its day as a source of ordering (Loader and Walker, 2007) – all the 
more so after the economic crisis of 2008 where the market required 
national states to step in to avoid financial meltdown. Some even see 
a process of de-globalisation under way. States can also use ostensibly 
transnational powers for their own local purposes (Sheptycki, 2002). 
Good comparison will almost always evidence the way nation-states are 
differently placed in dealing with or being subjected to transnational 
developments. Countries such as China and Russia are among the bet-
ter known examples of states that succeed in censoring or manipulating 
the internet. The same applies to levels of commitment to common 
standards that are apparently in the interests of all signatories. Within 
the European Union there are remarkable differences in the way coun-
tries implement national or European laws designed to prevent the 
defrauding the EU budget. In the 1980s the UK pressed strongly for 
more enforcement, at least until it worried that this could involve ced-
ing sovereignty over criminal law. Italy passed a specific law to deal 
with this form of criminal behaviour while continuing to rack up the 
largest frauds (Passas and Nelken, 1993). And nation-states showed 
little ability to collaborate via European institutions in effectively dealing 
with the problem (Nelken, 2003b).
It goes without saying, or at least it should do, that globalisation’s 
effects are not easily classified as either ‘good’ or ‘bad’ (also because 
globalisation can communicate the knowledge that can be used 
to help counteract its bad effects). On a Durkheimian view, where 
changing forms of social and economic exchange both reflect and 
produce changing forms of ‘moral’ interdependence, globalisation 
could contribute to a new international solidarity, as seen, for exam-
ple, in the penalising by some countries of sex tourism committed 
by their citizens abroad, or the strengthening of international crimi-
nal justice or the increasing rhetoric of international human rights. 
In a less utopian spirit, there are certainly many collective prob-
lems, from those regarding the environment to financial security, 
that cannot be solved by states acting alone, as well as many abuses 
suffered by individuals and groups which cannot safely be left to the 
states responsible for them to deal with. On the other hand, from 
a neo-Marxist perspective, globalised exchange can often involve 
exploitation as businesses and others find ways to avoid criminal 
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penalties in the ‘space between the laws’ and international bodies 
impose financial straitjackets in return for loans.
Some writers distinguish between hegemonic or counter-hegemonic 
globalisation (or between globalisation ‘from above’ or ‘from below’) 
but, in practice, it can be difficult to find fail-safe criteria for picking 
and choosing what is ‘progressive’ or not, and we must remember that 
intentions and outcomes often do not coincide. Any given interna-
tional blueprint or ‘global prescription’ (Dezalay and Garth, 2002) can 
have contradictory effects. The promotion of transparency, as urged by 
Transparency International, would seem to be an appropriate panacea 
for corruption, but closer familiarity with the phenomenon in specific 
contexts shows that transparency also has the effect of entrenching it – 
the more that is known about the use of underhand methods, the more 
others may feel they have to do the same (Nelken, 2009a). The attempt 
to move towards a ‘globalising’ criminological perspective has the merit 
of bringing hitherto neglected crimes such as state crimes (including 
genocide) into better focus (Morrison, 2004). But it can also serve to 
justify an imaginary ‘view from nowhere’ that serves mainly to pro-
mote Anglo-American models of the criminal justice state that can sap 
the social control potential of civic society (Newman, 1999; Van Dijk, 
2007; cf. Nelken, 2003a). The extension of human rights is a largely 
positive development, especially for the protection of women and 
other vulnerable groups (Merry, 2006; Cain and Howe, 2008). But, in 
the sphere of youth justice, globalisation spreads both an often harsh 
insistence on greater responsibility as well as a concern to protect rights 
(Muncie, 2005).
The fight against transnational organised crime offers the best 
illustration of these points. On the one hand, there are a variety of 
extremely serious harms committed by such groups. But for almost 
every one of their activities there are at least two narratives that can 
be told. One stresses the noble fight of the state and/or relevant non-
governmental organisations (e.g. Naim, 2005); the other the extent 
to which controllers selectively exploit the problems of given vic-
tim groups for their own interests (e.g. Van Schendel and Abraham, 
2005). The characterisation of organised crime groups often tells us 
more about political and law enforcement stereotypes than it does 
about their fluid and changing nature. The repeated scare claim – that 
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criminal justice is territorial whereas organised crime is not confined 
by national boundaries – tends to exaggerate the degree of collabo-
ration between such groups and to underplay the growth of official 
responses and the rise of domestic strategies of ‘governing through 
international crime’ (Findlay, 2008).
As this suggests, and here comparative criminal justice comes into 
its own, the local sense of any given global initiative needs to be 
carefully deconstructed. For example, the Palermo Protocol against 
human trafficking (‘the new slavery’ for sexual, child or labour exploi-
tation) has been signed – and ratified – by a very large number of 
countries. The Protocol has increased the possibility of providing 
relief to exploited victims of trafficking. But what is at stake in this 
campaign is not the same for supply, transit and demand countries 
(or for political elites, employers, workers and others), and the way 
in which individual countries use the Protocol is shaped by their spe-
cific political, cultural and other differences (Munro, 2006). Supply 
countries have desperate need of the economic remittances of their 
migrants. Churches in some places in Nigeria pray for the success of 
those who go abroad so as to earn remittances through some form of 
prostitution. Among demand countries, Sweden is engaged in an effort 
to reduce prostitution and makes little or no use of the Palermo Protocol. 
Germany and the Netherlands are more concerned about having well-
regulated systems of sex work. 
Italy claims to protect a relatively large number of victims. This may 
simply be a matter of geography, but another possible reason may be 
that dealing with prostitutes who decide to ask for help mirrors pre-
vious experience in handling ambiguous pentiti (the telling term the 
Italians use to describe Mafia members who agree to collaborate with 
the authorities). In addition, prosecutors and courts in Italy have a 
relatively high level of independence from government, whose prior-
ity is usually that of limiting immigration. The USA operates sanctions 
against countries it classifies as being reluctant to stop trafficking, but 
has learned to live with millions of unregistered Mexican migrants. In 
the economically advanced (demand) countries, the needs of victims 
continues to be subordinated to the goal of ending illegal migration. 
Conversely, some of the victims of even the most atrocious forms of 
sexual or labour trafficking may prefer their situation to the even worse 
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alternatives left behind (Davies, 2009). It is not easy to do justice in an 
unjust world (Nelken, forthcoming a).
Making similar? Convergence, copying  
and collaborating
There is increasing recognition that the globalisation of the ‘local’ 
depends on the localisation of the (supposedly) global. But there is still 
little agreement on how best to study these processes. In his important 
work on the ways globalisation is affecting youth justice, Muncie dis-
tinguishes three of these. The first he calls ‘from welfare to neo-liberal 
governance’. The second he calls ‘transfer and convergence’ of ideas 
such as curfews, welfare to work, boot camps and restitutive justice. In 
a third category he discusses international conventions on the rights 
of children (Muncie, 2005). But separating out developments into eco-
nomic, political and legal compartments, while it may be useful for 
some purposes, also has its limits. The same applies to a recent scheme 
proposed by Aas that focuses on what she calls ‘disembedding, accel-
eration, movement, standardisation, interconnectedness, vulnerability 
and re-embedding’ (Aas, 2010).
Case studies of the spreading of criminal justice ideas and practices 
are more promising for this purpose (see e.g. Newburn and Sparks, 
2004). But they need to be placed in some larger analytical grid (see 
Nelken, 2006f) such as one drawing on discussions of transplants and 
diffusion in the literatures of comparative law and social policy. Thus we 
can study what is being spread – scripts, norms, institutions, technolo-
gies, fears, ways of seeing, problems, solutions – new forms of policing, 
punitiveness, conceptual legal innovations such as the ‘the law of the 
enemy’, mediation, restitutive or therapeutic justice. We can also ask 
from where to where, for example from or to national, subnational and 
supranational levels in Europe, or more widely, or by agreement among 
signatories to conventions etc., or those subject to regulatory networks, 
and so on. It takes little skill to discover that what purports to be global 
frequently comes out of the USA, but members of the European Union, 
among others, are also quite actively involved, singly and collectively. 
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We also need to examine who is involved. Are the key actors legal 
ones, such as judges, lawyers, police, probation officers and prison offic-
ers (often through meeting colleagues from abroad)? Or are they repre-
sentatives of businesses, such as security providers or those who build 
and run private prisons. Or do we have to do with politicians, NGOs 
or pressure groups, regulatory bodies, journalists, or even academics 
themselves? Attention needs to be given to the role of institutions, 
singly, collectively or in competition. In Europe, but also beyond, EU 
institutions, the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human 
Rights (EHRC) system are important players. The same crime threat 
may involve intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations, 
such as the UN Commissioner for Rights, the International Labour 
Organisation, or the International Organisation for Migration, Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, etc.
Another set of questions has to do with the means by which crimi-
nal justice ideas and practices are being spread. Some exchanges may 
involve groups of ‘experts’; others only concern ‘virtual’ conversations, 
as in the way judges read sentences in other jurisdictions as they seek 
to provide justifications of local practices such as the retention or abo-
lition of the death penalty (Hood, 2001; Macrudden, 2007). Why do 
various initiatives follow given circuits? How is it that a given practice, 
such as adversarial justice, can spread so well abroad even while being 
so much criticised in its home countries? What are the implications 
of the fact that local agents and institutions often try to use their glo-
bal influence locally as a source of prestige in competition with other 
actors. Why do certain things appeal where they do? What explains why 
day fines and conditional dismissals make sense only in some places in 
Europe? Are there some approaches that everyone wants? Tonry argues 
that ‘technology is a no brainer’ and mentions prison security equip-
ment, credit card smart technologies and electronic monitoring (Tonry, 
2001). But apparently technical approaches, such as the move to ‘actu-
arial justice’ (Feeley and Simon, 1994), can produce quiet revolutions 
within the field of criminal justice. What counts as ‘only’ a technical 
matter will also vary culturally.
Finally, we also need to reflect on what succeeds and what is meant 
by success? Should this be defined in terms of how far it reproduces the 
original institution or practice or the extent to which an innovation 
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‘fits’ into its new place? The Italian penal procedural reform of 1989 
has been criticised for having being modified by the higher courts so 
that it no longer resembles the way it works in the USA (Grande, 2000). 
But it can be argued that it makes sense to (re)shape the adversarial 
system in Italy so as to take into account the very real danger of organ-
ised crime forcing witnesses to retract their statements at trial. In some 
cases, borrowing has nothing to do with making the borrower society 
more like the source of the practice, as for example when economically 
more developed societies introduce the idea of conflict mediation from 
less developed ones. In other situations, the aim is to become more like 
the source of borrowing (and/or the need to be seen to be like them), as 
with many of the law reforms quickly introduced by many ex-communist 
countries seeking to be part of the European Union.
Who decides what are the indicators of ‘success’, and whose claims get 
to be believed concerning what was supposed to happen – and has hap-
pened? Who gets to impose their sense of continuing similarity and dif-
ference, and its significance? Can a society get more than it bargained 
for (Nolan, 2009)? Discussions of the spread of criminal justice ideas 
and practices sometimes confuse explaining whether a certain model 
has spread successfully and whether this is a good thing. We are likely 
to be told that ‘zero tolerance’ ideas that have not changed practices on 
the ground are merely ‘symbolic’ (Jones and Newburn, 2008). On the 
other hand, if human rights ideas begin to change the local discourse 
(or add a new layer to it) even if they do not change (other) practices on 
the ground, this may nonetheless be counted as success (Merry, 2006). 
Does the spreading of ideas and practices encouraged by globalisa-
tion reduce differences among systems of criminal justice? To exam-
ine this key question it can be useful to distinguish among processes 
of convergence, copying and collaborating. Convergence can produce 
more similarities even where this is not the aim. Copying, by con-
trast, is an example of actively seeking similarity through borrowing or 
imitation. Collaborating, finally, involves trying to understand what 
others are doing so as to facilitate coordinated action, even if we do 
not necessarily want to copy them. 
Convergence has both objective and subjective aspects. Although 
technological and other changes can reflect and produce the need 
for similarity, it is also important to see (contrary to much writing on 
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the subject) that globalisation and homogenisation do not always go 
together (Nelken, 1997c). In its economic aspects, globalisation relies 
on and often reproduces economic and social differentiation. And neo-
liberalism too is compatible with socio-cultural differences between 
places (these can even be marketed). Cyberspace has lent itself not only 
to efforts to transcend boundaries of place and tradition, but is also 
used by those who seek to create tightly-bounded groups united by hate 
of those with different identities (Roversi, 2008). At the subjective level, 
the spread of globalising common sense means that distant forces pene-
trate local worlds and that local meanings are often dislodged (Coombe, 
1998). People in Germany fed on television episodes of Perry Mason 
assumed that they too had an adversarial system of criminal justice. 
Conversely, Garland’s work on the culture of control was soon translated 
and used by left-leaning Italians scholars as a spur to resisting the local 
tightening of official social control interpreted as essentially part of the 
same process (even if, arguably, this had more to do with the response 
to immigration). As this reminds us, the ‘same’ ideas in different con-
texts are not necessarily the same – and do not have the same effects.
When we study processes of borrowing and imitation we again dis-
cover that social actions do not always have the consequences that 
are sought. Jones and Newburn examined the outcomes of efforts in 
England and Wales to introduce US practices regarding private prisons, 
‘three strikes and you’re out’ sentencing reform, and zero tolerance polic-
ing. The authors saw themselves as trying to reconcile ‘insights coming 
from the broad global convergence and local divergence vantage points’ 
(Jones and Newburn, 2008: 8). Although they found clear evidence of 
borrowing taking place, they concluded that this has made relatively little 
difference in practice. By contrast, another recent description of trans-
planting US-style institutions (that unfortunately does not refer to Jones 
and Newburn) comes to somewhat different conclusions. In his excellent 
account of the introduction of US-type problem-solving courts to five 
other common law jurisdictions, Nolan stresses how much was success-
fully taken over. His concern, if anything, is that such borrowing will 
eventually bring about some penetration of wider aspects of US culture 
in societies that are purportedly somewhat critical of it (Nolan, 2009).
These authors may be using different criteria for judging ‘success’. 
Newburn and Jones are worried that borrowing from the USA could 
 the challenge of the global  83
increase incarceration rates (and their negative finding help explain the 
continuing gulf between the USA and England and Wales). Nolan has 
a more diffuse fear of cultural imperialism. He also recognises that any 
borrowing is inevitably affected by differences in the legal and gen-
eral culture of the importing country. Indeed, he shows us how the 
actors involved explicitly sought to modify what they were importing. 
Both Nolan and Jones and Newburn restricted themselves to borrow-
ing among jurisdictions within the common law world. Interestingly, 
however, Waquant is convinced that American cultural assumptions 
about crime have easily penetrated thinking in Continental European 
countries such as France (Waquant, 2009a, 2009b).
Many studies of collaboration in criminal justice worry about who is 
in charge and where it may lead. But they spend less time in discussing 
how it is even possible. Jacqueline Ross argues that champions of closer 
transnational cooperation may be too quick to envision it occurring 
through a series of technical fixes. In a series of richly detailed analyses 
she shows the considerable theoretical difficulties faced by those she 
interviewed when seeking to bring their own working practices into 
alignment with those that belong to other systems of criminal justice 
(e.g. Ross, 2004, 2007). In particular, she focuses on the significance for 
cooperating in the battle against transnational crime of the fact that 
the USA and European nations conceptualise, legitimate and control 
undercover policing in substantially dissimilar ways. 
Ross tells us that covert operations are everywhere controversial but 
that this may not always be for the same reason. In comparing American 
and Italian ways of formulating the issue, she argues that whereas 
Americans primarily worry that covert agents may corrupt innocent 
targets, Italians are especially concerned that covert operations may 
slide into state-sanctioned lawlessness (Ross, 2004). In America effort 
is made to strengthen the rights of the potential object of entrapment, 
but in Italy it is left to the prosecutor to keep the police in line. There 
are also considerable differences in the status given to informants and 
what they are allowed to do by way of breaking the law. Ross doubts 
that harmonisation of these countries’ legal regimes is feasible, even 
if this type of law enforcement is treated as exceptional and given its 
own special rules. She concludes with a mental experiment that shows 
that there would be need to be a major change in the domestic roles of 
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prosecutors for the two countries to be able to work properly together 
(Ross, 2004: 306). The extent of remaining differences is all the more 
remarkable given that Italy is the Continental European country that 
has done most to try to move towards the adversarial system.
Not the least of the differences that Ross underlines is her recogni-
tion that giving Italian prosecutors discretion not to enforce the law 
would involve changing the constitution. As we have seen when dis-
cussing obligatory prosecution, the second of our running examples, 
the stumbling block for many Italians is the danger that recognising the 
need for discretion can easily allow the government of the day to set 
and change priorities according to its own interests. She also notes that 
it is hard for outsiders to understand or copy the Italian way of unof-
ficial official discretion which allows them to work around rules where 
officially there is no discretion. As she rightly says, this puts a premium 
on being able to cover your back through political and personal net-
works (but she does not mention that this is true in Italy more gen-
erally). Ross also tells us about other practical problems that obstruct 
cooperation, from the lack of legal status for US undercover agents in 
Italy, to the lack of the language skills that would allow Italians to pen-
etrate foreign crime rings. Yet it is also important to remember that 
the media also report many examples of ‘successful ‘ collaboration, for 
example in apprehending suspected terrorists (even if not always on 
equal terms). This may be because Italy’s secret service(s) quite often do 
not keep to their own laws, and the police often respond to political 
dictates before later (sometimes much later) being brought to book by 
the more proactive members of the judiciary. 
As this implies, in addition to the many descriptive, explanatory 
and interpretative issues raised by the cross-national spread of criminal 
justice ideas and practices, there are also value questions of what this 
spreading does, could do or should do to diversity. Increasingly, the 
question of diversity between cultures overlaps with that of respect-
ing diversity within a society. If units are less and less distinguishable, 
this is in part also because of population movements. The many young 
female judges in the Italian courts increasingly find themselves process-
ing young Muslim offenders, usually by fast-track procedures for those 
caught en flagrente. On the wall hangs a crucifix. The legend inscribed 
over the bench reads that ‘the law is equal for all’. But this may not be 
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the way it is perceived. What aspects of this everyday situation, if any, 
should be treated as requiring more respect for diversity? More gen-
erally, as diasporic communities grow larger and more confident, the 
question arises to what extent nation-states should explicitly delegate 
to them powers of conflict-processing. 
International human rights standards are hammered out over years 
of negotiation so as to find phrasings that satisfy representatives of dif-
ferent countries and NGOs. But diversity re-emerges in the way such 
agreements are implemented. Although there is some debate about the 
possibility and merits of harmonising private law (especially within the 
European Union), discussion of this key question in the area of criminal 
law has been slower in coming. For a long time – even within the sphere 
of the European Union – politicians defended the distinctive features 
of their criminal law procedures, and only a few academics argued for 
a more common approach. More recently, there has been a change of 
heart, largely attributable to the threat of transnational crimes, espe-
cially terrorism, as well as concerns over irregular immigration. Within 
the European Union there has been some progress in creating shared 
policing and prosecuting institutions – and not only where this helps 
protect the European Union’s own funds. The European Court of Human 
Rights strives to arrive at some minimal standards in penal procedures, 
prisoners’ rights and similar matters.
But even what seem the most obvious attempts to improve proce-
dural protections for all defendants can be shown to often make mis-
taken assumptions about how different legal cultures operate and need 
to operate. Standards drawn from the adversarial form of trial can be 
based on a misreading of the logic of continental systems (Lasser, 2005), 
just as continentals often conflate the common law with its American 
expression. More generally, should we see reduction of diversity, in so 
far as it can be achieved, as progress or as a problem? So much of course 
depends on what is at issue – the decline in use of the death penalty, the 
elimination of torture, the setting of minimal standards for prisoners? Or 
are we speaking of sharing common definitions of corruption or ideas of 
how criminal procedures should be organised? 
The author of a recent introduction to comparative criminal jus-
tice offers the following reflections by way of conclusion to his book. 
‘Globalisation’ he says, ‘will diminish the variety of criminal justice 
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systems. Common threats will invite common responses, which will 
increase the similarities in criminal justice systems around the world’. He 
goes on to say that ‘on the one hand, this could be seen as a loss’. But, on 
the other hand, ‘criminal justice systems are not like the natural world, 
where we should celebrate diversity for its own sake. Increased require-
ments for communication and harmonisation provide rewards for con-
vergence, and criminal justice systems will, after all, be judged on their 
effectiveness’. In any case, he concludes, ‘one can remain sure that as long 
as cultures, languages, public opinions and social discourses differ, so will 
criminal justice systems and the way they operate’ (Pakes, 2004: 178).
These remarks, thoughtful as they are, also beg a number of ques-
tions. Is there really no reason to value diversity for its own sake once 
we recognise that criminal justice systems are not part of the natural 
world? What of the benefits of maintaining a variety of forms of social 
experimentation? What of the need for procedure to fit society’s val-
ues and its traditions? What if the greater homogeneity that emerges 
through the imitation or imposition of a currently successful Anglo-
American model reflects and produces the sort of society that requires 
a high level of punishment? Familiarity with the differences among 
criminal justice systems, including the three running examples from 
Italy that I have been using, should also make us cautious about the 
claim that systems of criminal justice ‘after all will be judged on their 
effectiveness’. Who will be (who should be?) the judge of effectiveness? 
It is not enough to say that ‘the balance between fairness and effec-
tiveness’ will be worked out differently in different places. The issue is 
rather whether what these terms mean stays the same and how far the 
metaphor of ‘balancing’ these ‘values’ is shared cross-culturally. 
Whether or not the source is rightly described as globalisation, pres-
sures for conformity do seem to be rising (Nelken, 2006f). But there 
can often be confusion between what is normal in the sense of not 
falling below a standard and in the somewhat different meaning of 
what is normal or average. Take again one of my running examples. 
It is important to ask how far the Strasbourg Court of Human Rights is 
imposing ‘universal’ principles of good practice of criminal procedure 
on the signatories to the convention it enforces, and how far – as in 
imposing limits on acceptable court delays – it is (also) involved in a 
process of ‘normalisation’ to a European average (Nelken, 2004a, 2008). 
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Why are trials that are too short – in the sense that they are well 
below the average time devoted to trial in comparable places – not also 
considered a breach of human rights? Is it right to threaten Italy with 
exclusion from the European Convention on Human Rights for conduct 
which follows from the fact that is an outlier? The only other signatory 
treated in this way is Turkey, for its failure to comply over Cyprus and 
its continuing maltreatment of the Kurds. Italian court times do create 
suffering. Justice delayed is, too often, justice denied. But it is at least 
questionable whether excessive court delay is the same sort of breach of 
human rights as torture.
six
whose sense?
In this final chapter, by way of conclusion, I discuss in turn the place 
of knowledge, understanding and method in comparative criminal justice 
and the role of researchers in constructing discourses about other 
peoples’ systems of criminal justice. After describing some of the traps 
lying in wait for those who blindly rely on local ‘experts’, I consider 
how far these can be avoided using the three research methods I call 
‘virtual comparison’, ‘researching there’, and ‘living there’.
On knowledge
We have seen in the previous chapters that criminal justice is not just 
a set of actions to be described, but is part of broader cultural ways of 
thinking, as found in a variety of locations or sites of interpretation. 
To appreciate other ways of defining and delivering official sanctions 
cannot just be a matter of identifying different units (states, organi-
sations, professional work groups or whatever) which exhibit varying 
practices and procedures. We also need to deal with the different logics 
that structure what is known (and what it is thought possible and desir-
able to know). For example, does the criminological distinction between 
‘white-collar’ and ‘organised’ crime correspond to an ontological reality? 
Or does it reflect a Protestant conception of the ethics of wealth produc-
tion that presupposes the inherent respectability of moneymaking and 
the ethnic composition of organised crime (Ruggiero, 1996)?
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There are important contrasts in national criminological literatures 
regarding what crimes are thought most worthy of attention, and which 
actors in the system are authorised to deal with them. There may also 
be telling differences in the availability and use of empirical descrip-
tions of the work of police or other criminal justice actors. On the other 
hand, both mainstream and critical discourses (Van Swaaningen, 1997) 
also cross-cut national boundaries. While discourses such as rehabilita-
tion or just deserts may have origins in particular places, their adoption 
hardly ever stops at the boundaries of national jurisdictions. The same 
applies to current attempts to introduce, monitor or regulate international 
standards. Ways of thinking are shared by various intellectual and policy 
networks (Edwards and Hughes, 2005) or ‘transnational epistemic com-
munities’ (Karstedt, 2002). Scholarly criminological discourse in turn is 
part of (and has varying influence on) a larger series of purported knowl-
edges, ranging from that found in official documents, through media and 
internet journalism, to popular culture and even advertisements, all of 
which help mould ideas about crime and its control. 
Both explanatory and interpretative approaches can be brought to 
bear on the question how knowledge is produced and used. We can 
ask, for example, about the causes and effects of such ‘knowledge’. Can 
American ideas about crime spread without necessarily leading to a rise in 
incarceration rates? What consequences are produced by classifications 
of levels of judicial integrity or rates of incarceration? How far does the 
publication of the results of public opinion surveys about fear of crime 
or attitudes to the criminal justice system make them self-fulfilling? 
Vagaries in what is considered ‘knowledge’, or who is considered an 
expert, can itself be a factor in accounting for changes in criminal 
justice, as seen in the growth of prestige of economists, accountants 
and experts in risk evaluation in the USA and the UK. But these devel-
opments may take a different form in different places, depending (as 
between the USA, Germany and Poland) on the classes whose ideas are 
hegemonic, the role of bureaucracies and competition between media 
outlets (Savelsberg, 1994, 1999; Savelsberg, King and Cleveland, 2002).
On the other hand, making sense of what passes for knowledge also 
involves questions of meaning. The scientific literature is often less 
culturally universal than it purports to be. Much influential criminal 
justice literature is American and carries entrenched culturally-specific 
assumptions about the nature of crime and the role of criminal justice. It 
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takes for granted the modern Anglo-American ‘pragmatic instrumental’ 
approach with its supposed aim of reducing recidivism. While insisting 
on getting beyond myths, it fails to see why, in some places, and at some 
times in all places, words speak louder than actions. Understanding 
criminal justice in an interpretative vein involves attempting to grasp 
the meaning of what other people are actually trying to do. But we also 
have to take into account the possibility that actors are not fully aware 
of what they are doing – and, still less, of its consequences.
The complexities of interpreting can be made clearer by taking as an 
example some remarks by Massimo Pavarini, a leading Italian criminol-
ogist. In an English-language article, he set out to explain what he saw 
as the implications of the ordinary Italian’s rejection of the state, and of 
the absence of Protestant structures of responsibility. ‘Its raining ... damn 
the government’, he says, ‘very aptly sums up how an abstract, imper-
sonal entity is blamed for everything that is seen as socially evil, unjust, 
undesirable and frightening. The Italian political lexicon is a complex 
weave of two historic traditions: the catholic matrix with its providen-
tial conception of history in which universal judgement has always out-
weighed individual judgement, and the Marxist matrix with its belief in 
the rebirth of society through revolution. Both these cultural traditions 
have encouraged the process whereby social expectations do not entail 
individual responsibility for society’s ills’ (Pavarini, 1997: 95).
A number of issues arise. How is this account likely to be understood 
by those with no first-hand experience of Italy? What does it mean to 
say that social expectations do not entail individual responsibility? In 
my experience of everyday life I see a rich texture of intertwined social 
and individual demands and expectations. So is this account to be read 
more as a critical ‘intervention’ by an engaged participant, and less as 
an effort at disinterested description? (Is it relevant that this statement 
is being made by a leading (ex)-Marxist criminologist in a book edited 
by a (once?) Marxist scholar? And what of the fact that Pavarini is him-
self personally one of the most responsible people one could ever hope 
to meet?) Even the most well informed of Italian criminologists, then, 
provides us with an interpretation of his society in the form of a riddle. 
Whatever else they show, these remarks also offer, albeit unwittingly, 
further proof of the extent to which Italians are unusually inclined to 
speak badly of their own society. During 2008 there was a news report of 
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a German offender who managed to get himself smuggled home from 
prison by using the post office to mail himself there in a large package. 
The Italian media commented that in Italy he might have made it out of 
prison but he would never have arrived home!  
On understanding
If even experts need to be interpreted, this makes it all the more impor-
tant to consider which informants we treat as experts and why we think 
they can be trusted. Yet most researchers are reluctant to recognise the 
implications of the fact that, in all cultures, descriptions and criticisms 
of social and legal ideas and practices carry, and are intended to carry, 
political implications. When we think of experts in own culture we will 
often, without much difficulty, be able to associate them with ‘stand-
ing’ for given political or policy positions. But it is no less essential, if 
more difficult, to be aware of this factor when we rely on informants 
from abroad. Think of the problem of deciding how far Italian judges 
involved in fierce battles with government proposals are mainly con-
cerned with defending themselves as a corporation. Some politicians, 
practitioners and academics are notoriously pro-judges, while others 
are virulently against them. The same applies to Italian criminologists 
writing about immigration and crime. There are bitter disputes over 
the question whether illegal and unregulated immigrants are over-
represented in criminal activity because they commit more crime, or 
are victims of selective criminalisation and the social constructions of 
(only certain) aspects of the crime problem. Whom do outsiders decide 
to believe and how do they decide? If there is any type of criminol-
ogy in which ‘reflexivity’ (Nelken, 1994a) is of the essence, it is surely 
comparative criminology. But it is unusual for researchers to include 
discussions of the way they are themselves part of the context they are 
describing (Nelken, 2007c). 
The issue ‘whom can you trust?’ is therefore as relevant to the proc-
ess of doing research as it is to understanding criminal behaviour and 
responses to it (Nelken, 1994b). Who is ‘authorised’ to speak for a given 
legal system or specific practice? How do their roles, as politicians or 
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policy-makers, members of the system, judges or other regulators of the 
system, employees of NGOs or pressure groups, journalists, academics or 
whatever, influence their knowledge and accounts of the systems they are 
describing. In the UK, police spokespersons provide influential accounts 
of the crime problem and individual criminals; this is much less true in 
Italy. On the other hand, in Italy, judges and prosecutors are perhaps the 
major sources of information about organised crime. Their ‘motivations’ 
of judicial sentences sometime run to thousands of circumstantially docu-
mented pages and few people worry about the dangers of using evidence 
crafted for legal purposes as if it were a sociological treatise.
Why should informants tell us what they know? Each criminal justice 
organisation is likely to have an ‘official line’ that it wishes to promote 
and secrets that it wants to conceal. Some informants may tell us openly 
that the position they are taking is an unconventional or personal 
one that is not shared by others. But, more often, they will want us to credit 
their view as the only one possible. ‘Correct’ answers by police in Japan, 
Johnson tells us, reflect tatamae, or socially approved image management 
(Johnson, 2003: 141). But is this not also true for Japanese prosecutors? 
And is this problem only relevant in Japan? Can we be more certain 
of our findings if informants coming from different groups provide the 
same accounts? Take the question of similarities and differences between 
what academics and practitioners have to say. If academics and practi-
tioners agree, could this be only because the academics are relying uncrit-
ically on information from the practitioners? If they disagree, could this 
be because academics are too cut off from what actually goes on? 
Even when we are sure that our sources are not ‘partial’ to one side or 
another – or we try to make allowance for this – there still remains the 
problem that experts and practitioners are undoubtedly part of their 
own culture. This is, after all, why we consult them. But this means that 
it is easy to fall into a comedy of errors in which we look for what is of 
interest to us, and they tell us what they think we want to know even if 
it is not what we should want to know. If we set out to understand why 
in the USA or UK criminal justice is relatively harsh we are less likely to 
find informants working in the system who share this preoccupation 
than people worried that not enough is being done to protect the public 
from crime – and this explains, in part, why the system is relatively severe. 
If we are interested in explaining why Italian juvenile justice is so tolerant 
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(Nelken, 2006b, 2006c), our informants are more likely to be on the look 
out for signs of harshness – indeed it is precisely that vigilance which 
helps explains the leniency of the system. In England and Wales, a system 
highly influenced by managerial considerations will be criticised for its 
inefficiencies. In Italy, a principled but inefficient system will regularly 
be attacked by local commentators on grounds of principle.
Cavadino and Dignan (2006b) make use of a series of academic 
informants so as to fill in the details of what they call the ‘idiosyncra-
sies’ of the societies they are comparing. But they tell us very little about 
how they chose their collaborators, nor seem to be aware that each will 
have his or her own disciplinary biases and local political allegiances. As 
far as Italy is concerned they rely mainly on a legal scholar who is a well 
known expert on juvenile justice, whilst also making extensive reference 
to the now somewhat dated writings of the early 1990s by Pavarini, a 
very different kind of criminologist, whose larger claims – as we have 
seen – can also sometimes be challenging to interpret. And mutanda 
mutandis the same applies to the other countries they discuss.
On method
From what has been said so far about the difficulties of interpreting 
another society’s practices, it should be clear that the method we adopt 
to overcome such obstacles will have crucial effects on the substance 
of our findings. Whether we are doing, reading or using comparative 
research, we must be aware that claims about why things take the form 
they do can never be separated from the issue of how sense is made 
of them – and whose sense that is. The three possible strategies I have 
elsewhere described as ‘virtually there’, researching there’, and ‘living 
there’ (Nelken, 2000a) may help to clarify what is involved in cooperat-
ing with foreign experts in other places, in interviewing legal officials 
and others in their own contexts, and in drawing on direct experience 
of living and working in the country concerned. 
The approach called ‘virtually there’ uses cross-cultural collabora-
tion as its means of arriving at reliable accounts of relevant differences 
between systems of criminal justice. Instead of going to learn about a 
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foreign culture at first hand, the researcher is content to be ‘virtually 
there’, by relying on an inside expert from the society or societies. At its 
worst, this can be a fig leaf for the worst sort of ‘comparison by juxtapo-
sition’. But, at its best, experts in the distinctive traditions of the socie-
ties in which they live and work take on the task of educating experts 
in the other system. Each therefore tries to familiarise the other with 
salient aspects of their own system in terms that can be related back to 
aspects of the other society. Such collaboration requires a high degree 
of mutual trust and often involves ‘negotiating’ mutually acceptable 
descriptions of legal practice in each of their home countries.
An excellent example of what can be achieved in this way is found in 
Brants and Field’s comparison of controversial aspects of police practice 
in England and Wales as compared to the Netherlands (Brants and Field, 
2000). Among other insights, they noted that in England and Wales, 
diversion was seen as a somewhat ‘guilty secret’, which compromised 
the ideals of adversarial justice in the interests of making the criminal 
process more expeditious. Diversion in the Netherlands, by contrast, 
was understood as an aspect of the wider ‘politics of accommodation’, 
which encouraged an ample use of prosecution and other official dis-
cretion. They also contrasted the changing ‘demons’ that were used to 
justify undercover police practices in the countries compared.
‘Researching there’, by contrast, is an approach in which the researcher 
is in direct contact with informants in their own society. This method 
can be illustrated by David Johnson’s interviewing a large number of 
prosecutors in Japan so as to explain differences in ‘role expectations’ 
there as compared to the USA (Johnson, 2000). Johnson’s main inter-
est was in understanding why prosecutors in Japan so often go out of 
their way not to charge suspects. Prosecution aims that are at home in 
Anglo-American legal cultures, such as that of ‘disposing efficiently of 
as many cases as possible’, came low down the list for the Japanese. The 
most important goals to which they subscribed turned out to be that 
of ‘discovering the truth’ and ‘making the correct decision whether to 
charge with an offence’. Interestingly, low priority was also given to the 
objective of ‘invoking public condemnation of the crime’, considered 
important by less than a third of his sample. Many of those interviewed 
did not even understand what this meant. Rather than seeking to clarify 
cultural assumptions through collaboration with other experts, or by 
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attempting to move backwards and forward between his own culture 
and that under observation, Johnson’s interview schedule was carefully 
designed to produce the same stimulus for all respondents so as to be 
able to standardise their answers. However, he admits that his approach 
has limits that need to be set against its strengths. For example, the 
questions Johnson planned to ask about whether prosecutors actually 
achieved their objectives were ruled off-limits. 
The third approach, which I have dubbed ‘living there’, involves 
wider participation in the general life of the country and may even 
include an active consulting/critical role in relation to the criminal jus-
tice system itself. The scholars who use this approach can be described 
as ‘observing participants’ (rather than participant observers) who come 
to enjoy the status of ‘insider-outsiders’ (Nelken, 2004b). Maureen Cain, 
for example, spent a total of eight years in the West Indies before return-
ing to Britain, and she was able to draw directly on her own experience 
of teaching and action rather than limiting herself to retelling what 
professionals or experts had to say (Cain, 2000a, 2000b). She tells us, for 
example, that the students she taught wanted what they considered to 
be accredited ‘universal’ knowledge but that she felt ill at ease:
Teaching about youth cultures in society which is not rigidly age strati-
fied; of teaching community policing and democratic accountability 
while lacking a language to describe a post-colonial service lacking a sense 
of direction, having lost its raison d’être, of talking ethnic minorities where 
historically – and arguably today as well – it is the culture and identity of 
the black former majority which is under threat. (Cain, 2000a: 265)
Different research strategies have different merits and there are the usual 
trade-offs, such as being able to cover more cases with questionnaires or 
interviews as opposed to in-depth observation, and so on. Methods can 
only be judged in terms of the objectives being pursued and it is impor-
tant to appreciate that each operate under their own constraints. The 
choice to follow any particular approach to data gathering in compara-
tive research will be linked to the many considerations which influence 
the feasibility of a given research project, including the time available, 
and whether one is able to visit the country concerned. But the three 
methods distinguished here can be placed on a continuum running 
from least to greatest engagement with another society, and this has 
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a number of implications. Virtual research and short research visits, 
by their nature, can require too much reliance on local experts and 
practitioners. Long-term involvement in a culture, by contrast, makes 
it more possible to discover the intellectual and political affiliations of 
our informants and gain direct experience of the relationship between 
criminal justice and wider aspects of the same society. 
Actually living in a place for a long period is the best – perhaps the 
only reliable – way to get a sense of what is salient. Seeing the difficulties 
of keeping to the many over rigid legal rules in Italy gives you more idea 
of why some people avoid them, and of what the judges are up against 
in their attempts to enforce them. Seeing how social control is exercised 
in Italian family life is indispensable for understanding what is and is 
not asked of its juvenile justice system. Having a social and occupa-
tion role in italian life was also helpful for finding out more about the 
practices that I have been using as running examples. I gained a deeper 
understanding of the actual effects of the rule of obligatory prosecution 
when a family friend explained that she would have liked to reserve her 
energies for pollution cases rather than low-level infractions without 
social consequences, but that her boss had threatened her with discipli-
nary proceedings if she risked allowing unimportant cases to fall into 
prescription. Participating in a national law professors’ project on legal 
delay made it easier to appreciate how far lengthy trials were the desired 
or undesired outcomes of procedural complexities.
A further advantage of actually living in a country comes from being 
better placed to convey in a convincing way the experience of what 
Geertz calls ‘being there’ (Geertz, 1988). Whether this be seen as some 
sort of reaction to the otherwise paralysing postmodern ‘crisis of rep-
resentation’, or, more straightforwardly, as a way of dealing with the 
suspicion that one has not really got to grips with the culture being 
(re)presented, there is no doubt that the descriptions that most influ-
ence an audience often take the form of vignettes drawn from life. The 
more opportunities to do this, the more convincing the argument as 
the story of the research comes to join the stories in the research. 
But we should not exaggerate the differences between adopting one 
or other of these methodologies. The insider-outsider’s direct ‘experi-
ence’ is always and necessarily marked by expectations based on pre-
vious socialisation – and the difficult trick is that of losing one type 
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of ethnocentrism without taking on another. Because the observing 
participant can experience directly only a small slice of life she, like 
those who use the other methodological approaches, is still largely reli-
ant on other people for ideas and information which lie beyond her 
direct experience. A person who lives in a place can also no longer pre-
tend to the same useful naiveté of a visitor. Once they have a recognized 
internal identity those with other loyalties will also be less willing to 
trust them (and they will compete for the same scarce resources.)
The insider-outsider too must learn from and contribute to a wider 
‘scientific’ literature. But, on the other hand, direct experience can help 
in grasping the meaning of concepts such as ‘clientalism’ in a way that 
a mere literature search can never do. It is quite different, for example, 
actually encountering (and perhaps suffering) one version of this intri-
cate combination of instrumental friendship and sponsored co-optation 
and then going back to the scientific literature to learn more about the 
wider varieties of this form of social and political ordering. The insider-
outsider is also often in a good position to appreciate how given litera-
tures which present themselves as standing above partial perspectives 
are in fact shaped by scholars with specific roles and standpoints.
Frances Heidensohn, an insightful writer on comparative issues, 
has recently proposed a richer classification than the three methods 
described above. She argues that it can be helpful to distinguish among 
accounts coming from strangers, refugees, explorers, reformers, bureau-
crats, armchair travellers and global theorists (Heidensohn, 2006, 2007). 
These categories can be especially helpful, she suggests, in showing how 
different roles can contribute to a division of labour of comparative 
work. Data, she argues, is typically provided by bureaucrats and explor-
ers, concepts come from strangers (but also from armchair and global 
theorists), whereas frameworks come from travellers of both types who 
gain overviews from their real or virtual journeys. 
The three approaches I set out were not intended to cover all 
aspects of conceiving and executing comparative research projects. 
But it is hard to see how or why the division of labour Heidensohn 
describes would actually come about between actors with such dif-
ferent reasons for seeking to understand criminal justice practices. 
On the other hand, often the same researchers switch between, or 
combine, the various roles that she outlines. For example, academics 
 comparative criminal justice98
are currently collaborating with the NGO Transparency International 
under a Seventh Framework programme of the European Commission 
with the aim of designing better anti-corruption tools under the title 
of ‘Promotion of Participation and Citizenship in Europe through the 
Advocacy and Legal Advice Centres of Transparency International: 
Analysis and Enhancement of an Anti-corruption Tool to Enable 
Better Informed and Effective Citizen Participation in Europe’.
Another, not untypical collaborative project under the auspices of 
JUSTIS calls on the talents of a number of European criminologists in 
a pioneering cross-national study of prosecution. This, we are told, ‘is 
a project designed to provide EU institutions and Member States with 
new evidence-based indicators of public trust in justice’. The aim of the 
project is to develop and pilot survey-based indicators with the stated 
intention being not only to understand common features and impor-
tant differences, but also to view these in the context of the planned 
common legal space within the EU and the tentative plans for a supra-
national prosecution service. The project’s interim findings supply lots 
of useful information about the systems being compared, often with the 
help of flow charts, special attention being given to what happens at 
each stage of the process in different jurisdictions. On the other hand, 
the goal of achieving more through disposals of high-volume crime is 
simply taken for granted. No mention is made, for example, in refer-
ence to Italy, of the role of obligatory prosecution and other specific 
features of the Italian legal system, nothing is said about the context 
of ongoing struggles between prosecutors and politicians, nor is any 
thought given to the political implications that proposals for standardi-
sation with other places might have for this or similar issues in Italy or 
elsewhere. The issues that matter are taken to be legal, technical and 
managerial ones. This is not to say, however that there is any necessary 
contradiction between practical engagement and valid research. The 
European Committee on Torture, for example, is one of the few sources 
of essential data on the international treatment of vulnerable people by 
different police forces and prison authorities (Morgan, 2000).
We need to be careful not to confuse ways of getting data with the 
use that will be made of it. In particular, the time spent in a place tells 
you little about what conclusions are likely to be drawn. For example, 
Clinard’s short visit to Switzerland led him to a positive assessment of 
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the country’s way with crime (Clinard, 1978), but Balvig’s even shorter 
visit there led him to more critical conclusions (Balvig, 1988). On the 
other hand, Downes (1988) needed only a short period to be impressed 
with prison policy in the Netherlands whereas his Dutch critics, actually 
living there, were much more cynical (Franke, 1990). On the basis of 
relatively short periods of research, Crawford criticises King, who lived 
for some years in France, for failing to see the downside of the French 
approach to crime prevention (Crawford, 2000b). What can be relevant 
to at least some of these disagreements is whether the study of for-
eign cultures is actually more about the home country than the setting 
being studied. It is reasonable to suppose that, as a very general rule, an 
insider-outsider who spends a long time in a foreign country is likely 
to become less interested in examining it for the lessons it supposedly 
has to teach those back home (except when writing for an audience in 
their country of origin). and as much, or more, in trying to understand 
it in relation to its own history and current challenges. They may also, 
by choice or otherwise, embrace a general world view closer to the new 
place where they are located (Bond, 1997).
The insider-outsider, whose work is not constrained by cross national 
policy-oriented projects or plans for harmonisation, may be asked or 
tempted to take part in the national or local debates and conflicts of her 
new society. In my own case, as an Anglo-American criminologist trans-
planted to Italy during the Tangentopoli anti-corruption investigations, 
it mattered to insiders whether I was ‘for’ or ‘against’ the judges. After 
writing some articles about Tangentopoli for English-speaking readers, I 
wrote a chapter in Italian, in a collection for a respected series of vol-
umes on Italian history, that attempted to tell the story of what had 
happened (Nelken, 1997b). I thought the piece was favourable to what 
the judges had achieved, and some senior left-wing judges later recom-
mended it to their readers. But because it did also contain some mild 
criticisms it was also seized on by writers sympathetic to the politicians 
under attack and praised in Parliament by a notoriously anti-judge 
deputy. I was then invited to act as an expert witness by lawyers defend-
ing a businessman facing extradition from the USA for what seemed then 
like a serious case of corruption. My task would have been to explain to 
the American courts that the crimes uncovered by Tangentopoli should 
have been considered political offences (Nelken, 2002). I declined this 
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invitation, the businessman was in fact extradited, but the court then 
found the facts he was accused of not to exist. 
Political corruption in Italy is no longer at the centre of local criminal 
justice debates, though it never seems to disappear for long. The burning 
issue now concerns the relationship between immigration and crime and 
the way this has encouraged fear of street crime. Should this new con-
cern about crime be understood (and opposed) as further evidence of the 
spread of American, hegemonic, neo-liberal-inspired ideas of punitiveness, 
as many left-leaning criminologists would have it? Or should it (also) be 
seen as a sign of a more democratic, bottom-up growth in individualist, 
consumer-based approach to politics and law that in Italy is accompany-
ing the inevitable (?) decline of (solidaristic) ideologies. Insider-outsiders 
have to relate their opinions and observations on this and other ques-
tions to those of the native members of the culture with whom they inter-
act. They may take themselves serving as a translator, commentator or 
counterpoint in respect to the views of their informants. Sometimes they 
will find the conformity of their colleagues or other informants judge-
ments with their own views as evidence for the soundness of their obser-
vations, at other times they may see more value in the freshness of the 
outsider’s perspective and see what natives say as data that itself needs 
interpretation. 
Whatever choice is made, the methods we choose and the way we 
use them are not only a means to obtaining information but are also 
intimately linked to the substance of what we find or think we find. 
They are an essential part of the ethical and political reasons for doing 
comparative work (Roberts, 2002), involving as this does engaging with 
and ‘representing’ the other, and being open to being changed by such 
encounters. It may be true that keeping faith with others’ meanings 
may not always be the only value in play. We may sometimes need to 
impose common meanings in order to get a collaborative project off 
the ground (Klockars, Ivkovich and Haberfeld, 2004). In some circum-
stances, depending on our approach to social science, we may even 
think that we know better than the people we are studying, the mean-
ing of what they are doing – or its implications. Or our goal may sim-
ply be to try and change what they are doing. But in all such cases, at 
the least we should be mindful of what is involved in making sense of 
difference – and conscious of the dangers of our presumption.
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